After an outstanding ten-and-a-half year run, the website "Defense and the National Interest," better known as d-n-i.net, will close down next Monday, November 23. Chet Richards, who with his wife Ginger has run the site through that time, says that for various logistical and practical reasons he is ready to move on to day-job concerns.
Chet (shown here), a retired Air Force colonel and math PhD, has been one of the most committed and effective proponents of the ideas of combat developed in the 1970s and 1980s by another retired Air Force colonel, the late John Boyd -- background here and here. Chet is an original thinker and strategist himself and has written about theories of conflict as they apply to modern business, technological innovation, "soft power," and so on.
There's an immediate reason for mentioning the site's pending close, apart from an appreciation of Chet and Ginger Richards, William Lind, Chuck Spinney, and others who have contributed to d-n-i's success. This is the main online repository for a lot of Boyd's briefings and papers, so if you think you might ever be interested in them, set aside a little downloading time over the weekend. Handy shortcut to some downloads here. Thanks to all involved.
Update: more on d-n-i, Richards, Boyd, and maintaining the archives here and here.
November 13, 2009
The right kind of "security theater"
It is not surprising that we'd find good sense about security in the words of Bruce Schneier, but this recent essay does the best job I've seen of explaining the balance between "real" and "symbolic" steps against terrorism; why some purely symbolic steps can be worthwhile; but why much of today's "security theater" is so misguided.
Read the whole thing, but crucial concepts are these. First, what we mean when we talk about "security theater":
"Security theater refers to security measures that make people feel more
secure without doing anything to actually improve their security. An
example: the photo ID checks that have sprung up in office buildings.
No-one has ever explained why verifying that someone has a photo ID
provides any actual security, but it looks like security to have a
uniformed guard-for-hire looking at ID cards." [My emphasis]
On why the steady accretion of "fighting the last war" security measures, especially involving air travel, are beyond the point. E.g., because there was once a shoe-bomb plot, we all now take off our shoes; because there was once a plot involving liquids, women have perfume and gels seized from their purses, etc. There's always a demand to do "something," and...
"Often, this 'something' is directly related to the details of a recent
event: we confiscate liquids, screen shoes, and ban box cutters on
aeroplanes. But it's not the target and tactics of the last attack that
are important, but the next attack. These measures are only effective
if we happen to guess what the next terrorists are planning.... Terrorists don't care what they blow up and it
shouldn't be our goal merely to force the terrorists to make a minor
change in their tactics or targets..."
On what the right kind of security theater would mean: I think this is the most important and, to most politicians and readers, novel part of Scheneir's argument. He says that the best way to reduce the damage terrorism can do is to act as if we're not scared of it.
"The best way to help people feel secure is by acting secure around
them. Instead of reacting to terrorism with fear, we -- and our leaders
-- need to react with indomitability.
"By not overreacting, by not responding to movie-plot threats, and by
not becoming defensive, we demonstrate the resilience of our society,
in our laws, our culture, our freedoms. There is a difference between
indomitability and arrogant 'bring 'em on' rhetoric. There's a
difference between accepting the inherent risk that comes with a free
and open society, and hyping the threats...
"Despite fearful rhetoric to the contrary, terrorism is not a
transcendent threat. A terrorist attack cannot possibly destroy a
country's way of life; it's only our reaction to that attack that can
do that kind of damage."
I am predisposed to welcome this argument, having made my version of a similar case three years ago (with guidance then from Schneier and others). But this is an unusually strong formulation from an unusually well positioned authority. Please do read what he says.
November 12, 2009
More on the undercover TSA officers
Two days ago I mentioned the delightful story about the TSA's plan to place "behavior detection officers," or BDOs, in airports and to disguise them in ... TSA uniforms. Herewith several relevant responses.
1) About the plan's underlying genius:
"There are so many security officers at the airport that one no longer notices them. It's like policemen at the US capitol building, or people wearing orange clothes at a Clemson football game. Clothing that would be conspicuous in normal situations becomes the best way to blend in at the airport."
2) About how it may be working in Seattle:
"I witnessed this in action at SeaTac airport on this past Sunday morning. But I have to say the quote: "They do not focus on nationality, race, ethnicity or gender, said TSA spokeswoman, Sari Koshetz, does not ring true.
"As I (a nicely dressed white middle aged woman) sat there a young woman of Asian heritage was approached and asked for her boarding pass. She complied and I didn't think anything of it but realized it was a newly established check point. Then a few minutes later another TSA agent approached the same woman and asked again. Hmmm, was she so nervous looking? Not to me, she looked like the rest of us bored and waiting to go folks. She did have a nice long conversation on her cell phone in a language I could not understand but there are thousands of people who do this. Another young white woman who was sitting to my right was shocked and said "but they just asked her". Yep. So they don't focus on nationality, race or ethnicity? I am not at all convinced and will be observing to see how this plays out." [JF note: Like all law enforcement work, this is tricky. Eg, in any sensible risk-based system people in their 20s would deserve more attention than people in their 70s or 80s. The trick of course is drawing the line between that sort of common-sense triage and blanket categorization. Let's hope TSA is working on it.]
3) An account from inside the system:
"I [have a relative] who is in fact one of the Behavior Detection Officers your item today mentions. She is a very nice, petite Asian woman, and she finds it pretty entertaining that she is now a BDO and gets to flag people for extra security, question them, etc.
"Some of her comments to us about her job raise some questions (for me at least, I don't think she thinks this critically about her job) about how these officers are regulated, and their approach to screening.
I do love this story. There's good news from a report about the TSA in yesterday's Washington Post! In addition to relying purely on the screening techniques we all know so well from airport security lines, the TSA has people roaming the airports checking out travelers who give off a suspicious vibe:
"To identify potentially dangerous individuals, the Transportation
Security Administration has stationed specially trained
behavior-detection officers at 161 U.S. airports. The officers may be
positioned anywhere, from the parking garage to the gate, trying to
spot passengers who show an unusual level of nervousness or stress.
"They do not focus on nationality, race, ethnicity or gender, said TSA spokeswoman Sari Koshetz.
"We're not looking for a type of person, but at behaviors," she said."
Good idea! The whole complaint about rule-based, one-size-fits-all screening systems is that they're not sufficiently flexible, discriminating, or directed toward more serious threats.
On the other hand, this charming detail from the story:
"It's not easy to spot detection officers. Working in teams of two and
clad in TSA uniforms, they blend in with those performing screening
chores at the security checkpoint."
Yes, there is no chance the bad guys will spot them! Like plainclothes cops, cleverly hidden from drug dealers etc when they are disguised as regular policemen.
Of course, maybe this article itself is part of an elaborate cover operation, lulling plotters into thinking that the only people they have to watch for have TSA suits on. Yes, that must be it. [Thanks to D Lippman]
November 9, 2009
What has happened to the F-35?
Seven years ago I wrote in the magazine about the genesis of the F-35 fighter plane, known back then as the Joint Strike Fighter or JSF. ("Uncle Sam Builds an Airplane," June, 2002.) At the time, the JSF was supposed to be the solution to one of the modern military's worst problems: relentless and "unexpected" cost growth. Year after year, ships, missiles, tanks, etc go up "surprisingly" much in unit cost, so year after year the numbers in the inventory go down. The JSF was explicitly designed to break the cycle. In three complementary models, it was supposed to suit the differing aviation needs of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Like a car or computer meant for a broad global market, it was intended from the start to fit the needs of a large number of allied militaries.
As part of the story said:
"The JSF matters because of both its scale and its conceptual
ambition. The planners at the Pentagon and at Lockheed Martin imagine
that as many as 6,000 of these airplanes may be bought, at a total cost
of as much as $200 billion, over the next twenty-five years. If all
goes according to plan, about 3,000 of the JSFs will go to the original
"investors" in the program--the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps,
plus the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy in Britain. All have shared the
cost of developing the plane. The other 3,000 are supposed to go to
customers in the rest of the world."
That was then.
In this new column at Military.com, Winslow Wheeler -- part of the group of defense thinkers I mentioned yesterday -- talks about what has happened to the JSF as it has evolved into the F-35. Main plot line: cost has gone up, reliability has gone down, capabilities have fallen short of promises -- all of these "unexpected" changes forcing the planned number of purchases down, which in turn has pushed unit cost up further still. Check out the full account at Wheeler's column. And consider this part of the original article in light of what has happened seven years into the project:
"The ambitious idea behind the JSF is to address several chronic
problems of U.S. military acquisition policy simultaneously. If it
succeeds, it will put military procurement on a more affordable, more
effective track. If it fails, it will underscore how deep those
problems are."
November 7, 2009
In defense of the TSA
On the "man bites dog" front, and in the spirit of fairness, here are two items on behalf of the TSA. Or at least in opposition to some lines of criticism (like this recent one from me).
First: I can't believe that I've learned only now that the TSA has its own chatty blog, which takes up various criticisms, especially from web sites, and gives the TSA's answer. For instance, if you want to know their response to this famed cartoon from XKCD.com, check here.
The wonderful headline on another item
at the blog: "Response to 'TSA Agents Took My Son.'" I won't say that I
am tremendously convinced by their rebuttals, but I do (seriously)
admire the effort, and the flair. (I learned about the blog via Bob Collins of Minnesota.)
Next, below and after the jump, a reader's message in response to the recent GAO critique of TSA, mentioned here.
"While agreeing with the spirt of your attack on TSA, I'm not sure the jab is well centered.
"The GAO report is about TSA funding new technology. Clearly that is a botched job -- the withdrawal of the "puffer" machines is a demonstration that TSA is not good at funding R&D. But it has nothing to do with TSA screening tactics -- which I agree are not "risk based". And on the larger level, I'm not sure a blanket risk analysis is an effective tool for deciding where to put R&D dollars.
The monthly "Airport Policy News" reports by Robert Poole, of the Reason Foundation, are a steady source of nuggets about economic, technological, and political developments in the aviation world. I would send a link to the latest report I'm about to cite, except that what's online, here, is routinely a few weeks behind what's come out in the newsletters.
I am not a full adherent to the Reason Magazine/Ayn Rand view of the world (I loved her books when I was 14, though!), including some specifics about aviation. But we are as one in dismay about the combination of authoritarianism, empty symbolism, and undiscriminating clumsiness that makes up much of our current TSA policy. See my Atlantic colleague Jeff Goldberg on this point too.
Poole's latest nugget is a GAO report on how the TSA is doing. Links to the full 75-page report and summary highlights are here. The cover page gets across the essential point, which is that years and years into its existence, the TSA is still not basing its screening plans, its strategy, or its technology on assessment of relative risk. That is, if you wonder why the two-year old in a stroller is getting the full pat-down and why so many TSA procedures fail the basic-logic test, it turns out that the GAO wonders those things too.
From its summary:
"TSA completed a strategic plan to guide research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies; however, the plan is not risk-based. [My emphasis.]...
"Since TSA's creation, 10 passenger screening technologies have been in various phases of research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, and deployment, but TSA has not deployed any of these technologies to airports nationwide.... In the case of the ETP [ a new scanner], although TSA tested earlier models, the models ultimately chosen were not operationally tested before they were deployed to ensure they demonstrated effective performance in an operational environment. Without operationally testing technologies prior to deployment, TSA does not have reasonable assurance that technologies will perform as intended."
Much more from the full GAO report, here in PDF form. I realize that there are bigger emergencies in America right now. But the ongoing impossibility of applying logic to this situation really is discouraging -- or, more positively, is an opportunity for someone in government to address.
October 28, 2009
The logical core of Matthew Hoh's resignation letter (updated)
This passage from his letter is to me the heart of the argument for curtailing rather than expanding America's stake and commitment in Afghanistan:
"I find specious the reasons we ask for bloodshed and and sacrifice from our young men and women in Afghanistan. If honest, our stated strategy of securing Afghanistan to prevent al-Qaeda resurgence or regrouping would require us to additionally invade and occupy western Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, etc. [My emphasis.] Our presence in Afghanistan has only increased destabilization and insurgency in Pakistan where we rightly fear a toppled or weakened Pakistani government may lose control of its nuclear weapons. However, again, to follow the logic of our stated goals we should garrison Pakistan, not Afghanistan. More so, the September 11th attacks, as well as the Madrid and London bombings, were primarily planned and organized in Western Europe; a point that highlights that the threat is not one tied to traditional geographic or political boundaries."
The United States entered Afghanistan -- properly and with every moral and practical justification -- to disrupt, punish, and kill groups that had planned the 9/11 attacks. It is now in a mess in Afghanistan largely because of the crucial misjudgment nearly eight years ago to shift effort and attention to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Not everything in foreign affairs can be explained by logic. But as Hoh argues, if we're serious in thinking we can now eliminate terrorist threats with our troops in Afghanistan, then logically we must also send them to Pakistan and beyond. And if we're not serious, then how can we keep them there?
For-the-record point: resignations on principle are vanishingly rare in U.S. government practice. It's much easier to keep your head down, protect your career prospects, and when it's over say that you had been against [failed policy xx or yy] all along. Apart from the merits of his argument, Hoh deserves respect for taking this step so forthrightly. Each person who does so creates an example for others to reflect upon.
UPDATE: A reader in Europe writes,
"There's an interesting book (dated,may well be 30 yrs old) comparing resignations in the UK with those in the USA, showing that the British tradition allows to resign and later be appointed again because you did the "honourable thing" whereas in the US excuses like"return to the family"or "other pursuits" were mostly used to cover up."
The book he is referring to is Resignation in Protest by Edward Weisband and Thomas Franck, which I have heard of but have not read. Thanks to reader P.A.
October 26, 2009
McChrystal as Obama's savior?
I mentioned recently William S. Lind's argument that Gen. Stanley McChrystal has, intentionally or not, done the Obama Administration a favor with the bleakness of his report on the prospects in Afghanistan. In response to the recent Australian analysis of the McChrystal report, cited here, a reader writes with a view complementary to Lind's:
"I suspect that the news media and blogosphere has overplayed the
tension between McChrystal and the Obama administration. As your
recent post on the Afghan Rorschach test suggests, McChrystal has given
an unvarnished assessment of the state of play, and a fairly
unvarnished assessment -- or at least a shockingly high assessment --
of the numbers of troops he needed to 'turn the conflict around.'
"In short, he made his troop request high enough to be
fairly easy to reject, and his report pessimistic enough to rule out an
Obamaesque middle course He can't be expected to craft a report that
would make withdrawal seem easy, but it is to his credit that he
(unlike Westmoreland) has made a good faith effort to make increased
commitment seem hard.
"One of the problems with civilian commentary on
Afghanistan is that civilians have been much slower than the military
to learn the lessons of Vietnam."
October 25, 2009
More on the Afghan Rorschach test
A friend in Australia pointed me to the transcript of a speech in Canberra last week by Paul McGeough of the Sydney Morning Herald, who has reported extensively from Afghanistan over the past eight years. The war in Afghanistan has been a bigger matter for a longer time in Australia than in the US, in part because Australian troops have suffered many more casualties in Afghanistan than in Iraq. McGeough's speech is coruscating, and it uses Gen. McChrystal's report in a way I haven't seen applied anywhere else: as a radically honest reporting document, which in its very honesty reveals why its recommendations would not work out.
I mean these few samples to whet interest rather than to substitute for reading the presentation as a whole. Although he is tough on the Obama Administration, McGeough offers no support to the likes of Dick Cheney and his recent criticisms. As McGeough says in the final words of the speech, referring specifically to the Bush Administration's choice to switch manpower, money, and attention from Afghanistan to Iraq starting in late 2001:
"By the way, a recent American intelligence estimate put the
insurgency's full-time fighting strength at at-least 25 000, up 25 per
cent on the previous year. There should never have been a debate about
how strong the insurgency is. They were on the run in 2001 - and they
came back, only because they were allowed to."
Below and after the jump, other samples of his reasoning. But please do check it out. First, on the similarity between the Soviet and American wars.
"After eight years, Washington finds itself in the same position that the Soviet Union was in Year 8 of its occupation of Afghanistan, seemingly having learnt nothing from history - until McChrystal's bombshell assessment.
"I want to read from a defence official's letter dated August 17. He calls for an honest admission of failure after eight years, citing the squandering of huge material resources and considerable casualties and a failure to stabilise the country - militarily or politically. Most of the population has lost trust, because the campaign is bogged down and a strategic breakthrough is unlikely.
"The experience of the past years," he continues somberly, "clearly shows that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by military means only. We should decisively reject our illusions and undertake principally new steps, taking into account the lessons of the past, and the real situation in the country..."
"That might have been a note to General McChrystal as he prepared his report - but the date was August 17, 1987. And the author, Colonel K. Tsagalov, was addressing the then newly appointed Soviet defence minister, Dmitry Yazov."
The NYT op-ed page that has just gone up, for tomorrow morning's paper, has as concise a paired description of options in Afghanistan as anyone could want. Each of the articles is by an American writer with experience in the region. One says we should send more troops; the other says that would be a mistake. Each is clearly written with a brief passage that distills the outlook and sensibility.
One says:
"The United States was born of our ancestors' nationalistic resentment
of a foreign power whose troops we saw as occupiers, not protectors.
The British never fathomed our basic grievance -- this was our land, not
theirs! -- so the more they cracked down, the more they empowered the
American insurgency....
"We have been similarly oblivious to the strength of nationalism in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly among the 40 million Pashtuns
who live on both sides of the border there. That's one reason the
additional 21,000 troops that President Obama ordered to Afghanistan
earlier this year haven't helped achieve stability, and it's difficult
to see why 40,000 more would help either."
And the other says:
"During 10 days spent in Afghanistan at the invitation of Gen. David
Petraeus, the head of Central Command, I observed that a difficult task
has been further complicated by the checkered results of the Afghan
election. But what seems to be conspicuously absent from the
conversation in the United States is the realization that Afghanistan's
corruption problem, like its security problem, can be best addressed by
additional troops.
"Given what I saw and heard on my visit, I
believe it is indeed possible to get Afghanistan's politicos to do a
better job -- you just have to watch them closely.... Poor governance is an argument for, not against, a troop surge. "
The writers' identities are after the jump. I'm concentrating on the arguments themselves because I think they represent an extraordinarily pure Rorschach test. There are cases where you can listen to various sides and think, "Well, they've all got good points." But in this case, I bet most people will think: one of these perspectives rings true, and one sounds tragically deluded. Certainly that was my instant reaction -- and for that clarifying power I am grateful to both authors. Read, react, reflect.
Thanks to many tech-world friends for the lead. Eventually I'll make a separate "security theater" category for this site. For the moment, some previous entries here.
October 14, 2009
On the chain of command
After I mentioned last night that I disagreed with Robert Kaplan's call for an immediate commitment of more US troops in Afghanistan, I received a note that reminded me of a point I had meant to make. It concerns the chain of command and the different responsibilities of a theater commander (like Gen. McChrystal, in Afghanistan) and the commander in chief (like Pres. Obama, in Washington). I raise the point not to drag out a disagreement with a friend and colleague but to clarify an elementary but sometimes muddied issue.
My correspondent, a veteran of the defense and technology businesses, notes these lines from Kaplan's piece:
"The position Obama's now in is similar to that of former Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld some years back--appearing not to be listening
to his generals. If the president doesn't agree with his field
commander, that's fine. Just don't make a public spectacle of it."
And says that this misconstrues the way the disagreement came to light:
"...since it was the leaks (from wherever -- I suspect [name redacted!] to Bob Woodward that publicly highlighted McChrystal's disagreements with the President. Only in the face of continued leaks about how "long" McChrystal's report had sat on the President's desk sans action did the President's team (NSA Jim Jones, CJCS Mullen) finally proceed to remind -- and quite obliquely -- those in uniform that disagreements with the Commander in Chief should be expressed privately, not aired publicly.
I think that's right as a matter of fact. And as a matter of policy, the point I meant to make is that a president should of course listen to his generals on questions of military operations, trade-offs, resources, etc. But it's worth remembering from Civics 101 that they must listen to him on questions of larger national interest and strategy.
The complaint about Rumsfeld was that he ignored -- in cases like Eric Shinseki's, stifled -- military professionals who warned how hard it would be and how many troops it would take to complete the mission the Bush administration had decided on. Their argument was: if you're going to do this, do it right. That is exactly the kind of advice military professionals are expected to give their civilian commanders. It's what Bush, Rumsfeld, et al should have listened to. (Apart, of course, from listening to a wider range of views about launching the invasion at all.)
That is a different kind of listening from what is emerging with Gen. McChrystal. Whether or not this was his intention, his quoted advice comes across less as, "If you're going to do X, then do it right" than as, "You should do X..." Figuring out what it would take to protect Afghan citizens and win a counterinsurgency effort is the general's job. Figuring out whether that is worth doing is the president's. Again, an obvious point but worth restating.
One comeback would be: Obama's already made up his mind! He said that Afghanistan was the "necessary war," and if he is committed to the end then he is committed to the means. To call his original choice into question would waste time and look weak. As Bob Kaplan put it, "the time to roll out a new or adjusted strategy would have been
when McChrystal's selection was announced, so that he could become the
face of the new policy."
This is where we disagree. I think the time to adjust the strategy is as new evidence comes in and until you've done something irreversible -- and that in these war-and-peace matters it is better to be inconsistent than wrong. That is why I think a thorough reconsideration is just what the Administration should be doing right now. I start out believing that the less-bad option is to curtail rather than expand America's commitment in Afghanistan -- all options being bad because of the fateful mistake of switching attention to Iraq eight years ago. But I'll listen to a case for expansion differently if I think it comes from an open assessment of all possibilities, rather than because it's too late to change course or risk losing face.
Last on this theme: the same reader offered this link to another valuable "be careful what you're getting into" analysis of Afghanistan, from Survival magazine. I agree with Andrew Sullivan's current examinations of this difficult choice, here and here. And, having watched the Frontline "Obama's War" broadcast last night, I share the widespread endorsement of it. Can be viewed online here.
October 7, 2009
The TSA: bringing us ever closer to China!
One of the predictably nutty aspects of life in China was the tyranny of objectively unimportant details of ID records. To mention only experiences I had first-hand:
I once had to buy a whole new airline ticket for a Beijing-Shanghai flight, and tear up my existing one, because the airline ticket agent had hand-written my first name on the ticket as "Jame," which didn't match my passport name. Similarly: the English-language on-line ticketing system for the Beijing Olympics had spaces for entering your first name and family name -- but no space for a middle name. (The Chinese version had spaces for the three characters in most Chinese names.) So when I went to the Bank of China to pick up the tickets I'd ordered and paid for, I showed my passport for identification -- and settled in for hours of argument, since my passport showed that I was James M. Fallows and the tickets were for James Fallows. How could this be the same person?
Thus it was with with a sense of deja vu and doom that I heard this summer about the TSA's new "Secure Flight" system, designed to match the Chinese government's pettifoggery about ID cards. (And in China, it is a more defensible bias. They have many more people, and many fewer available names, so their hairsplitting about naming details comes closer to making sense.) Well done yet again, TSA! If you were going to learn something from the Chinese security system, how about their "of course you can keep your shoes on" screening policy at airports?
Just now in the email, I find that this insistence on form rather than common sense ("the appearance of security is security") is leaking over to some of the private sector too. Thus, a similar "Secure Drive" message from a car rental company.
Grrr. I childishly express my resistance by signing in as "Jabba the Hutt," "Charles Manson," "Kim Jong-il" etc when made to sign my name on "security" registers -- really, "security theater" registers -- at office buildings. I'm waiting for the time some dozing security official calls me back and says, "Wait a minute, Mr. Hutt, why isn't your middle name capitalized?"
October 1, 2009
At the F'DOH
Today and tomorrow, most of the Atlantic's staff is at the Newseum in Washington, for the "First Draft of History" conference. Live streaming webcast here, along with pictures, real-time updates, after-action analyses, and so on. Atlantic staff members are rotating in the role of Official Recording Secretary (aka blogger) for each session. My duty today was the Brian Williams-David Petraeus discussion. First dispatch here; longer followup, with four clips of Petraeus in action, here. __ I spell F'DOH with an apostrophe in homage both to Homer Simpson and to Portuguese Fado music. Although I realize that for Homer alone, it should be FD'OH.
September 22, 2009
Two views of SECDEF Gates
In response to this item yesterday, noting Robert Gates's mention of John Boyd as one of the "transformative figures of American air power," two reactions. The first is from a relatively recent product of the Air Force Academy (whom I don't know). The second is from a long-standing friend who is a quite experienced veteran of the defense business. First up:
"I graduated from the Air Force Academy in 2002, and while I was there Boyd was taught in our Military Strategic Studies courses as though he was the latest in a line of military theorists that stretched from Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, Mitchell, Liddell Hart, Boyd, and Warden. In fact, Boyd's OODA loop was taught with such reverence that I distinctly remember making light of it with my classmates.
"I am a few years to junior for such an assignment, but were I on the the staff of Secretary Gates assisting with the preparation of speeches, I would not have batted an eye at the inclusion of Boyd among that line up, and I doubt any officers from my cohort would either. If anything, LeMay strikes me as out of place and far more controversial in today's Air Force."
Now, from Charles A. Stevenson, a friend and former professor of mine who has written a book, SECDEF, about the "nearly impossible job" of running the Pentagon:
"I share your surprise and satisfaction over the performance of Bob
Gates... I fully expected him to follow the Laird model: wind down the
war in Iraq, cut deals with the senior military on other issues,
end-run the White House types on issues that mattered to him. From his
long government service and membership on the Iraq Study Group, that
seemed likely. His appointment by Obama suggested that the new team
liked his style and welcomed the political cover he provided as a
Republican.
"Now I think his closest model was the first SecDef
Gates, Tom Gates, who had served several years in the Pentagon under
Eisenhower before being elevated to SecDef.
I keep waiting for SECDEF Gates to do something really stupid ...
... and I'm sure his time will come. (Most likely occasion of error: Afghanistan.)
But for the moment, he keeps offering surprises in the opposite direction. Including last week, with this speech to the Air Force Association convention, the ending of which is exemplary in two ways.
For one thing, it ends with what used to be known in speechwriting land as an "ending," rather than the boilerplate that has become standard in presidential addresses. The ending is nothing special, but at least he tried. (And he didn't take a shortcut with "God bless the Air Force.")
More important is this peroration, which starts with an appreciation of Billy Mitchell and goes on to say:
"It strikes me that the
significance of Mitchell and his travails was not that he was always
right. It's that he had the vision and insight to see that the world
and technology had changed, understood the implications of that change,
and then pressed ahead in the face of fierce institutional resistance.
" The transformative figures of American air power - from Mitchell
to Arnold, LeMay to Boyd - had this quality in varying degrees. It is
one I look for in the next generation of Air Force leaders, junior and
mid-level officers, and NCOs who have experienced the grim reality of
war and the demands of persistent conflict. These are men and women we
need to retain and empower to shape the service to which they have
given so much."
Whoa! To have John Boyd -- fighter pilot, theorist of combat, unbelievably persistent thorn in the Air Force establishment's side from the late 1960s through his death a dozen years ago -- become part of an offhand, last-name-only allusion to the "transformative figures of American air power" is something like the moment when establishment economics began including "Keynes" in their list of major figures.* Gates had done homage to Boyd before, for instance as discussed here. But this is a further, interesting, and deserved step. The Gates-misstep watch perforce continues. ______ * For as much more as you would like to know about John Boyd, you can follow the links in this previous item, or of course read Robert Coram's wonderful biography Boyd. On the Keynes comparison, I don't mean that Boyd ideas have affected as many people in as many countries through as many decades as Keynes's have; but the vindication of ideas previously considered total heresy is comparable.
September 11, 2009
September 11
Some of the Atlantic's articles from the past eight years, collected here, stand up well as assessments of the moment and its aftermath. As a way to return to the mood, the reactions, the unity, and the incipient disagreements of the attacks on September 11, 2001, William Langewiesche's American Ground will be studied and admired for a long time.
If you're looking for thematic readings today, you could do very well with the links on this page -- not simply the four articles in the center of the page but the six others in the "From the Archives" column.
The newspaper story that struck me most today was this one, by N.R. Kleinfield in the New York Times: "A Fortress City that Didn't Come To Be." Its subject is New York, and it explains how, despite its unprecedented loss and trauma, the city recovered not just its vitality but also its deeper sense of balance. It decided to go ahead as a live, open, and inevitably still-vulnerable city, rather than surviving hunkered down, as an armed camp. Having visited New York only once since moving back to the country, I am struck by how much lower is its level of "security theater" than what prevails in Washington. Usually I regard New York as an interesting variation on "normal" American life, rather than as an example to the rest of us. I think in this case it has been the most American part of the country.
September 8, 2009
Now this is tempting: ideas for the DHS!
From a contact within the greater "Homeland Security" community, a link to the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, an interactive exercise to gather suggestions for what the DHS should start doing, and stop doing.
The survey, which can be found here, was initially supposed to end this past weekend. But due to interest and demand, it's been extended through Wednesday, September 9 -- tomorrow as I type.
From the registration page, here, it looks as if "General Public" is one of the category of "stakeholders" allowed to express views on the DHS's future. Who says this isn't the age of transparency and interaction?
Over to you, members of the Homeland American public.
September 6, 2009
Festival of updates #6: TSA vs. the toddler menace
No, this doesn't prove anything, but the picture is too interesting not to share. It's from a reader who describes his experience at BWI airport. It was back in 2005, before the BWI-specific improvements mentioned here, so maybe this would never happen again. But...
"Attached is a picture of my daughter (15 months old at the time) being frisked by a TSA security screener at BWI....
"I had been carrying her through security after putting the stroller through. Of course the metal detector detected something. You can see in the picture that I am holding my pants up with my hand rather than my belt and have no shoes on so who knows what it was. Maybe it was her shoes - they didn't make her take them off. I got the feeling when they called a woman over that they were going to frisk her so I called to my wife who had already gone through to get a picture. Sure enough they gave her the wand metal detector and pat down treatment."
If all of this were part of a shrewd, realistic, threat-based strategy of imposing inconvenience and occasional humiliation only when necessary, then -- great! But in reality....
September 4, 2009
Holiday festival of updates! #1 in a weekend-long series
Labor Day Weekend wouldn't be the cherished American ritual it is, without cookouts, beer, one last beach weekend frequent updates on past technical, political, and aviation matters. To kick off this special all-weekend series, an airline industry insider's account on why the Transportation Security Administration condones class-war in the airport security system: Shorter lines for high-mileage passengers (like me! until my China-travel miles time out), all the longer waits for everyone else. Here's the inside view:
"You might have already gotten this from other sources, but as a 25-year
airline industry veteran, the discriminatory TSA lines are easily
explained.
"They exist because the Legacy Airlines cut a deal
with senior-level political appointees in the early days of the TSA,
and no one has ever challenged them, and it is set up so no one can
challenge them. The airlines are, of course, not actually paying
anything for the privilege of deciding which taxpayers have
first-class/second-class access to federally mandated security
screening. The "justification" is that airline rents and fees "pay" the
costs of the airport, therefore they have the right to control how
"public" spaces in the terminal are used. Neither airports or the TSA
gets an incremental dollar for allowing this discrimination.
"The
floor space used to sort passengers into different queues is officially
controlled by the airlines, and is separate from the space (just behind
it) that is controlled by the TSA. Thus the situation is quite
different from discriminatory queues you might
have experienced in London and other overseas points, where the
airlines actually paid money to fund separate "business-class" airside
access
points. All that money you paid United to earn Platinum status pays for
the lounges and upgrades you get. But your preferential TSA access is a
gift from the government, and a "wealth" transfer from all of us in
steerage to all of your friends in business class.
Don't know how to explain it, but over the past week I've received a large amount of correspondence all with the same gripe about the Transportation Security Administration: its role as enforcer of class-inequality among the airborne traveling public. (Previously on the TSA here.) For instance, this sample note, from a military official with whom I've usually corresponded about Iraq policy and so forth:
"My big puzzle/complaint with TSA: how can they enforce and man discriminatory lines in the airport check in? If someone is paying United more for a first class seat they can enjoy better service and seating on United--but in going through gov't run, TSA-manned security, how can there be a first class line with faster security checks? It's a clearly wrong, illegal practice.
"I protested it once--going through first class line with my cheap seat ticket, and refusing to go back, pointing out that this is a government security service, not the airline, and its illegal for gov't to discriminate for a business. They called security police, I continued arguing for 10 minutes, got escorted through, then subjected to thorough bag searches despite having waved my military ID around. I had plenty of time to waste on this, and it did no good apparently (unless they've stopped this practice at Las Vegas airport). They may argue that its the airport folks who man the front part of line, but that's often not true, and it is always TSA folks at the security end of the line--they are illegally discriminating."
Thanks to my travel back and forth from China in recent years, I have a million-zillion miles on United and therefore am in favor of any class inequality that might favor high-mileage customers like me. But I recognize that having public officials doing the favoring is unseemly. This is the next-to-last straw in judging the TSA an experiment that desperately needs to be rethought. The last straw comes from Patrick Smith, of the always-excellent "Ask the Pilot" site on Salon, who asks pointedly whether the intrusive and expensive TSA checklines are doing any good at all. Read his whole column for details, but here is the gist [my emphasis added:
"The novelty of the Sept. 11 attacks notwithstanding, the primary threat to commercial planes is, was and shall remain the smuggling aboard of explosives, which is what happened on Pan Am 103 [the Lockerbie explosion twenty years ago whose instigator was recently set free]. The bomb came onboard in a suitcase. The hijack paradigm changed forever on 9/11, rendering the inflight takeover concept unworkable for a terrorist....
"Yet whether by virtue of incompetence or willful ignorance, TSA continues to waste untold time and untold millions of dollars on a tedious, zero-tolerance fixation with blades and sharps. This does nothing to make us safer, and in fact draws security resources away from worthy pursuits.
"Yes, TSA scans most bags for explosives. Mandates were put in place after 9/11 that have greatly increased the percentage of bags that are run through high-tech detectors, with a goal of screening all of them. But eight years later, screening is still not fully comprehensive. It does not yet include 100 percent of luggage and cargo, and procedures remain inadequate at many overseas airports from which thousands of U.S.-registered jetliners depart each week.
Neither is there widespread screening for explosive materials that somebody can carry on his or her person. Good luck getting a hobby knife through a concourse checkpoint, while a pocket full of Semtex is unlikely to be noticed....
"There is a level of inherent risk that we simply must learn to accept. But, if we are going to have an airport security apparatus, and if we are going to devote millions of tax dollars to the cause of thwarting attacks, can we please do it smartly and at least improve our odds?
Am I the only one who finds it maddening, and even a little scary, that we can't get this right? Is it not a national disgrace that TSA should spend its time confiscating butter knives from uniformed pilots rather than focusing on deadly threats with a long historical precedent?
"Where are the voices of protest? As I've said before, the airlines
ought to be speaking out and pressuring TSA to revise its policies. I
know it puts them in a tough spot, liability-wise -- carriers don't
want to be perceived as opposing security, even when that security
isn't helpful -- but much of what people despise about flying pertains
to the TSA rigmarole.
"And passengers, for their part, are
apparently content with, or at least resigned to, the idea of security
theater in lieu of the real thing. Indeed, rather than demand or expect
change, hundreds of thousands of Americans have paid good money for the
chance to simply circumvent the hassle of TSA."
Amen. Now, if there were only some way to channel the surplus emotion from anti-health-care-reform "town meetings" and direct it toward the excesses of "security theater."
More love for the TSA (plus actual good TSA-related news)
Four ways of looking at the TSA (drawn from reader mail, following this and this item): As possibility for political symbolism:
"Political experts will disagree, but the smartest thing that Gingrich and Co did back when they took over Congress was kill the federal speed limits. It told every American that they were serious about killing outdated government regulations and it gave some moral power to their deconstruction.
"In another era, Miranda rights, repeated endlessly on TV cop shows, gave every American the idea they had "rights".
"I remember an axiom, perhaps from Nixon, that every President needs to kill a government department on taking office. Killing TSA, and saving $5 for every airline ticket sold, would seem to be an enormously easy venture. Going back to your 1977 article, What Would Jimmy Carter Do?" [Deferring comment on this last point for now.]
As occasion for good news! A reader sent this positive account from a recent trip via BWI airport in Baltimore:
"The last time we traveled through BWI in July, we noticed that TSA seemed a lot friendlier. Someone near the area where you got screened was announcing a list of things that you had to take out of your bags to be screened separately. This list included some things that I considered fairly bizarre like an accordian. This made the TSA look a lot less humorless than they had been before.
"I do agree with you that the shoe thing needs to stop. There are some people trying to sneak through with their Vibrams or similar shoes. These are still rare enough that they puzzle some TSA personnel."
As it turns out, there is a reason why BWI seems less maddening/harassing than most other airports! A friend who works for IDEO, the famed design firm, pointed me toward a report showing what IDEO had done to reduce the going-crazy experience of passing through airport check lines. It's here, and it includes apercus like this:
"It was clear that trying to observe the subtleties of hostile intent
would be less effective in a chaotic environment filled with stressed
passengers. IDEO was engaged to design a solution that calmed the
environment of the checkpoint, thus making potential threats stand out."
1) Demonstrating the mathematical theorem that TSA+Google Ads = unintended comedy, reader Andrew Hall shows what happened when he clicked on the trailer for the Hilary Swank / Amelia Earhart film:
In case you can't read it, the pop-up ad says: "Homeland Security: Become a TSA Scanner by Earning Your Degree in Homeland Security." I hope it's a joke -- I mean, including the "Degree in Homeland Security." But I fear it is not. FWIW, my pop-up ads on the same trailer were all for the WaWa grocery store chain.
2) I said that the Grace McGuire story had a happy ending. After TSA security-theater threatened to close down her reconstruction of an Amelia Earhart-type plane, the pre-approved crew from a San Diego museum had taken over the task. A reader begs to differ:
"Happy ending..." you say, at the end of today's piece.
But probably not for the "....variety of craftsmen and suppliers who happened to come up with the right part for the plane...." not to mention the likely large number of simple voluntary workers on such a project.
Case in point: My 76 year old mother, who is the non-flying secretary of her local EAA [Experimental Aircraft Association] chapter, was a volunteer member of a group which recently completed the restoration of a Viet Namese era artillery spotter plane. She, and the other 60 and 70 something year-olds who restored that Piper took great pleasure and pride in what they did, and the results - in fact, they're planning to do another plane in the not-too distant future. What a shame it will be if their ability to make some contribution, and derive a sense of satisfaction and worth from the effort, is prevented by the TSA's bureaucratic nonsense.
3) Just because it's both China-related and aviation-themed, here's a YouTube video of China's first all-electric plane, the Yuneec. (Say it out loud. Hardee-har!) Kind of odd video, but looks like fun -- it's at a California airport I know well. And, to bring things back to a TSA theme, never once in my many, many trips through Chinese airports did I have to take off my shoes. I mean, except on flights back to the U.S. Let us learn from a 5,000-year-old culture to the east. (More here. Thanks to Ted Pearlman.)
As a conservative, I did not vote for President Obama. Nonetheless, it's my hope that some of the sillier things instituted by the Bush Administration would get thrown out.
Why hasn't the Obama Administration acted to clean up the public image of TSA? Specifically, why hasn't TSA stopped making people take off their shoes? It's the silly tip of the iceberg of silly security theatre.
I'd think that the President would win himself a lot of independent votes by getting rid of this rather ridiculous measure. Have any ideas as to why it hasn't happened?
August 25, 2009
Why we love the TSA, chap. #14,867 (Amelia Earhart dept)
The most interesting movie trailer I've seen since coming back to America -- OK, the only one -- is for Hilary Swank's upcoming biopic about Amelia Earhart. Opening shot below; link to full trailer at the bottom.
This is timely not just because the movie looks so gorgeous -- as does Swank, reinforcing the beautiful androgynous kinship in appearance between Earhart and the young Charles Lindbergh -- but also because the latest small chapter in the war of TSA-vs-common-sense involves Amelia.
Four years ago, as described in this NYT article and this one from Smithsonian Air and Space, a New Jersey pilot named Grace McGuire resolved to recreate Amelia Earhart's round-the-world journey, in a restored version of the same kind of Lockheed Electra airplane Earhart flew. All instruments, equipment, and detailing would be similar. The big difference, as McGuire pointed out in her standard punch line, is that she intended to get home safely rather than disappearing over the South Pacific.
McGuire encountered various obstacles along the way, most notably a struggle with Lyme Disease that for years left her too weak to advance her plans. But her most recent hassle has been with our friends at the TSA.
As described here in AVweb and recounted on many general-aviation sites, the TSA has been ramping up background-check requirements for anyone who does any work, of any kind, at any site where flying craft can land. Most of the nation's 4000-plus small airfields have historically been very casual, low-formality, open operations, policed mainly and effectively by their community of users. To people who have worked at and gathered around them, the airports' openness was much of their American-freedom-style, Earhart-and-Lindbergh-style appeal. To the TSA, it looks like a threat. An overheated pilot partisan argues here
that fortifying little airports is part of the Big Government vision of "Team Obama." Her heart's in the right place about the TSA, but of course these rules and the overall security-theater approach got started under the previous team.
McGuire had moved her Electra airplane to the tiny Santa Maria airport in California, a very nice little field very far from big cities. Restoring a 75-year old airplane meant a lot of ad hoc visits by a variety of craftsmen and suppliers who happened to come up with the right part for the plane. Putting every one of them through Federal security checks and certifying them for permanent airport ID cards, before they could drive up to the little airfield and repair an aileron, was bringing the project to a halt.
Help has arrived, in the form of the San Diego Air and Space Museum. Its staff has already passed TSA security checks, and it will take over restoration of the plane. Happy ending -- but you wonder, will there ever be a chance to say, Enough with the petty security theater, and let's think about the courage and common sense that keep free people free. (Anyone who wants more on this topic, see here and here.)
Back to Hilary/Amelia: film trailer below.
August 20, 2009
About that "ominous" building in Burma
Two weeks ago, I posted this photo, with accompanying expert commentary about the possibility that the malign regime in Burma was using North Korean aid to build a nuclear facility:
Subsequent commentary knocks down that speculation and comes to the (reassuring!) conclusion that it is very likely just a big industrial plant. Eg, Mark Hibbs of Nuclear Fuel, quoted on Arms Control Wonk, says this:
According to some information that sources said has been made available to Western governments and the IAEA, the "box" in the photos is likely not a reactor but a nonnuclear industrial workshop or machinery center.
That
determination, the sources said, follows from the absence of certain
"overhead signatures" for a reactor in the photos and from specific
information derived from firsthand knowledge of the site and its
activities, deemed to be highly reliable.
'We can conclude that it's not a reactor with near certainty," the Western analyst said.
And from Arms Control Verification.org, via The Interpreter in Sydney, extra photos and commentary supporting the same "less than meetings the eye" conclusion. Eg:
We learned from two sources, independent from
each other, that the box-like building has been under scrutiny by the
IAEA's [International Atomic Energy Agency] Department of Safeguards for quite some time, and that the
department is nearly certain that the building does not serve any
nuclear programme. An official, associated with a Western intelligence
agency, later told us that, "we've been looking at that site for years,
since construction started. You cannot hide a reactor in a low building
without a basement level". A relatively recent visit to the facility
has reportedly confirmed with '99 per cent confidence' that it is a
machine shop..
We'll take our reassuring news where we can find it.
August 4, 2009
More Burma nuke background
In this item, yesterday, from Jeffrey Lewis's Arms Control Wonk website. It discusses the implications of the feature shown below on the Burmese landscape, taken (I assume by Lewis) from a Google Earth shot.
And, as several readers have written in to suggest, thought experiment: Might this development have something to do with Bill Clinton's sudden trip to North Korea?
On a related topic, the implications of ever more-complete and higher-rez coverage form Google Earth, as in pic above, are only beginning to sink in. A friend mentioned yesterday that extremely fine-grained coverage of a number of places had just gone up in GE, including of my recent hometown of Beijing. I can now see the individual windows of the apartment building from which I used to take "Beijing air quality photos." Will put that up at some point.
August 3, 2009
Ready for this? Nukes in Burma report
A friend I've known and trusted for years in the national security world sent me this report from the Bangkok Post yesterday. Obviously that means it's not "secret" material, and the report itself the result of reasoning and guess work rather than anything more definite. But the authors include Desmond Ball of the Australian National University, who is a well-established authority in nuclear weapons and strategic studies. (Nothing against the other author; I just don't know of him.) They begin their findings this way:
"Our own starting position was one of deep
skepticism, but the testimonies from two defectors forced us to
consider the uncomfortable possibilities of a Burma with nuclear
capability." (Photo Bangkok Post)
The reason this would matter is that Burma has arguably the worst government in the world -- and if not the very worst, then right up there with North Korea in having its own concept of "rationality." (This was the government that would not allow outsiders to help the victims of the devastating typhoon/cyclone last year.) And the gist of this report is that North Korea has been working with the Burmese regime on nukes. To this point, the Burmese regime's destructiveness has been visited exclusively on its own country's people rather than against its neighbors. Of course, nuclear weapons can change things.
We have seen in recent world history the danger of leaping to conclusions about which dangerous regimes have what new weaponry. But to me this was news worth putting on the worry-scope.
Extra items from the Bangkok Post here and here. The Interpreter, from the Lowy Institute in Sydney, today has a thorough rundown of the rumors and counter-arguments here. After the jump, my friend's informed gloss on the affair. ___
Since, atypically, this appears not yet to have been mentioned by any of my on-the-news Atlantic.com colleagues, let me refer anyone who has not seen it to the full text of Col. Timothy Reese's memo urging a rapid exit from Iraq, "It's Time for the U.S. to Declare Victory and Go Home." I first saw it this morning at the Washington Independent site, here, and recommend the full thing to anyone who has read only news summaries.
Opinion has always varied widely within the professional military about the prospects and best options for America's presence in Iraq. So this obviously does not represent a new military "consensus." But it makes a big difference to have this case argued by a senior U.S. military officer on the scene. Well worth reading.
July 26, 2009
Civil(ian)izing 'Homeland' Security
In the current issue of the magazine, I argue that creating the ungainly amalgam known as the Department of Homeland Security was a mistake in the first place. (A mistake in concept, in that it was part of the panicky "do something!" reaction after 9/11. And a disappointment in execution, in that many years later there's little evidence of money being allocated more sensibly, overlaps being eliminated, or "stovepipes" of information really being combined.) And if it's too late to do any good by pulling the pieces apart again, at least we could try to buffer its worst, permanent-security-state implications, starting with its wholly un-American name. The piece is only a little longer than this paragraph, but it has a few more details and leads.
A reader has written in with a tangible suggestion:
Yes, the name "Homeland Security" is simply horrible, but the clothes may be the real problem. This may sound frivolous, but I don't think it is. The issue is boots. Combat boots. Boots with pants tucked in and "bloused." Black boots with thick soles. Swat teams wear them, and now Border Patrol folks routinely do. Coast Guard folks wear them, when they used not to. I believe that wearing military-type boots instead of shoes tends to make the wearer feel more military and therefore more aggressive. Customs agents used not to take undocumented people off ferries that don't cross international borders, but they took people off internal Washington State ferries last year. Coast Guard personnel used to be regarded as people who helped boaters, but now they wear boots and talk like fighters.
One great way to civilize Homeland Security would be to confiscate the boots and reissue shoes.
To see what the reader is talking about, here are pictures from a startling NYT article by Jennifer Steinhauer from this past spring, which I missed while in China. It is about how Explorer Scouts are being trained for future "Homeland Security" duties, starting with realistic uniforms (complete with boots) and gear. I was once an Explorer Scout, and we spent a lot more time pitching tents and sucking rattlesnake venom out of puncture wounds than doing this. (In fairness, we did get to spend several days on a Navy aircraft carrier in San Diego wearing sailor gear.) Photos by Todd Krainin in this slide show.
Practice border-control work, by scouts whose trousers are bloused into their boots:
Scouting in the age of the permanent-security state:
July 22, 2009
Two articles from Counterpunch (updated)
Two of my friends of longest standing (note how I avoid saying two of my "oldest friends") have articles online at counterpunch.org that deserve notice.
Eamonn Fingleton, who has been based in Japan for years and has been both contrarian and right in emphasizing the residual strength of Japanese manufacturing (even as the Japanese financial system collapsed), now has an article about the American media's coverage of Detroit. It is mainly a corrective to the automatic sneer at U.S. automakers that characterizes much political and press commentary about them. The article says:
As
press commentators have generally spun it, the Detroit story has been a
simplistic morality tale of "incompetent executives," "lazy workers,"
and "intransigent unions." Detroit in other words has richly deserved
its fate and, in the opinion of many of the more callous observers, the
sooner it is put out of its misery the better.
The real story is a complex one in which the American auto industry has often been more sinned against than sinning.
The article is very heavy on US-Japanese auto competition; for the record, I disagree with Eamonn on a few of the harpoons that he hurls. But the simple rarity of arguments on the automakers' behalf makes the article worth considering. Update: Another illustration of its approach, from the beginning:
To see how well -- or rather how badly -- you understand the background, try this quiz:
1.
What was the Detroit companies' share of the Japanese market in 1930?
(a) About 90 per cent. (b) About 20 per cent. (c) Less than 4 per cent.
2. How many models do the Detroit corporations currently make with the
steering wheel on the right (the standard configuration for Japan)? (a)
More than 40. (b) 12. (c) 3.
3.
What was the combined share of all foreign makers - American, European,
and Japanese - in the Korean car market in the last decade? (a) Less
than 2 per cent. (b) Around 15 per cent. (c) More than 70 per
cent.
The correct answer in each case is (a).
If you flunked, don't feel bad. Just cancel your newspaper subscription.
I don't buy Eamonn's "cancel your subscription" advice, since newspapers are just behind carmakers in their overall distress. But his overall pitch is significant.
Also we have Franklin "Chuck" Spinney, whose name is familiar to anyone who has read or thought about American defense policy over the last generation. Based purely on his study of conflict through the ages, last year Spinney made a call about Obama-McCain campaign tactics that proved far shrewder than that of many political "experts" at the time.
In his new article, he makes a call about President Obama's expanding commitment to Afghanistan that is convincing to me and should be alarming to anyone who reflects on what the U.S. is getting itself into. Both articles very much worth a look.
July 21, 2009
Raptor down (budgetarily)
I emerge from the land of no internet or email to hear about today's crucial Senate vote to delete funding for additional F-22 "Raptor" fighter planes. For why this was an even-more-crucial-than-it-seems sign of whether the new Administration was serious about SecDef Robert Gates' impressive speeches about bringing rationality to defense spending, see here, here, here, and here, for starters. For much more about the F-22 from the Project on Government Oversight, here, and from the Center for Defense Information here. For a summary of why the vote matters, consider this statement from retired Army General Paul Eaton, of Iraq fame, from the National Security Network:
"In stripping $1.75 billion in funds to build seven more F-22 Raptors from the Defense Authorization bill, the Senate has brought our military spending one step closer to matching America's military priorities for the 21st century. The Cold War relic was a symbol of the outdated, unnecessary, and expensive weapon systems that have burdened our defense budgets for far too long....Misplaced defense budget priorities such as additional funding for the F-22 both constrained America's military from adequately addressing the threats we face today and took money away from more essential strategic imperatives."
This issue isn't over -- the House still has to act, and there is the conference etc. And we are nowhere close to having a defense budget that is "rational" in some larger sense. But on both merits and symbolism, this is a significant moment. And as matter of political anthropology, it seems as if President Obama's atypically hard-line promise to veto the entire spending bill if it included more money for the Raptor had its effect.
July 9, 2009
Cornucopia of updates #7: Great Firewall
Everyone on the China beat already knows this, but for bystanders curious about how China's internet-filtering system adjusts to breaking news, see this report from China Digital Times. It's an intercepted (and, to me, legitimate-sounding) new memo from state propaganda authorities about the items that search-engine companies must block from their results. The memo is of course in Chinese, with CDT's translation. Brief samples:
以下关键词请屏蔽无结果,不设相关搜索,今日(8日)19时生效。
Please screen out the following keywords, no relevant search results. Effective starting 7 pm today [July 8, 2009].....
"冲突 汉维""维冲突 汉族" "维族冲突 汉族" "维族冲突 汉人" "维族冲突 汉族人" "维族冲突汉族同胞""维狗冲突 汉族"
"维族狗冲突 汉族" "维族狗冲突 汉人" "维族狗冲突 汉族人" "维狗冲突 汉族同胞" "维族狗冲突汉族同胞" "新疆人冲突 汉族"
"新疆人冲突 汉人" "新疆人冲突 汉族人" "新疆人冲突 汉族同胞""新疆狗冲突 汉族" "维族狗冲突汉人" "新疆狗冲突 汉族人"
"新疆狗冲突 汉族同胞"
"conflict, Han and Uighur" "Conflict, Han and Uighur people" "Conflict, Han and Xinjiang people"
"Conflict, Xinjiang dogs and Han compatriots" "Conflict, Xinjiang people and Han compatriots"
For background on the Great Firewall, try here. In some other update, it will be worth talking about the Chinese government's press strategy during this emergency, which so far is strikingly different from past practice. During the Tibet turmoil early last year, the government tried its best to keep foreign reporters and outsiders in general away from the action. This time, it is conducting press tours of Xinjiang for foreigners. Rapid-adaptation to changing circumstances has been a hallmark of Chinese economic policy but not so much of its international diplomatic stance. We'll see how big a change this is.
July 8, 2009
Cornucopia of updates #4: Xinjiang
Following this selection yesterday of pictures of Uighur students in Xinjiang.
- On why this eruption, violent as it and its suppression have been, is unlikely to shake the government's control of or support in China, my friend Russell Leigh Moses of Beijing, in this op-ed in the NYT today, makes the right points and presents a convincing argument. Gist:
"The state apparatus has become dizzy with success in dealing with
unrest. This gives little hope that further mass outbreaks will not be
violently crushed. It also demonstrates that social upheaval will not
pave the way to democracy. The party is too strong and confident to
allow change from below."
The contrast between the Chinese state's continued ineptness in appealing to international opinion and its very effective control of opinion and knowledge within China is worth remembering at all times, and especially during crises like this. From the outside, these may look like challenges to the survival of the regime. From the inside, to most people in China, they're new occasions for national fortitude and solidarity.
- On the roots of the conflict, Glenn Mott of the Hearst Corporation (also a friend), who has been in Beijing as a Fulbright lecturer at Tsinghua University, sends this report:
"What we saw this week should be familiar to us as Americans. This was a race riot, not a political insurrection. It is what a young Chinese engineer I had lunch with today called an ethnic "brawl" with Uighurs and Hans throwing rocks over the heads of police in between. We should notice there is progress at the central government level--foreign journalists are in fact being given some access to Urumqi--though social networks have been cut, and Xinhua is carefully editing for fullest grim effect on the Eastern Chinese psyche.
"But with no public space in the media to cultivate a civil society, to debate and discuss grievances, and none on the horizon, the Han and Uighur of Xinjiang are caught in a hopeless deficit for information about each other's grievances. This is the same all over China (between developers and farmers, and between local government and petitioners, for instance) lacking a public space for civil discourse, lacking rule of law, lacking release and resolution except in private conversations and ultimately, into the streets they go."
He attached a recent photo of the storied Uighur trading city of Kashgar, which is being razed so it can be rebuilt in a "safer" way.
- On fiction-list suggestions, I have mentioned many times this past year a spy-thriller novel by the British writer Charles Cumming, called Typhoon. It is about a Uighur uprising in Xinjiang -- in the novel's case, abetted by outside agents. I will have serious/non-fiction reading tips later, but this is the most relevant thriller.
- On general introduction to the Uighurs and their situation, this brief video by the Stanley Foundation has a lot of useful information, including an interview with Rebiya Kadeer, a Uighur emigree blamed by the Chinese government for much of the upheaval. It also includes an interview with a very tired-looking me after a trip to Xinjiang.
- On America's stake in Xinjiang, it is a lasting error and embarrassment that after 9/11 the U.S. won Chinese government support by agreeing that Uighur separatists -- formally, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization -- should be seen as part of the world terrorist threat. After all, they are Muslims.
May 21, 2009
On Obama's security speech
Carried overseas on BBC, and in prepared text here from the Washington Post. WhiteHouse.gov site, by the way, is once again weirdly behind-the-curve in getting material up.
Argumentative crux of the speech to the left (emphasis added):
I have opposed the creation of such a Commission because I believe that
our existing democratic institutions are strong enough to deliver
accountability. The Congress can review abuses of our values, and there
are ongoing inquiries by the Congress into matters like enhanced
interrogation techniques. The Department of Justice and our courts can
work through and punish any violations of our laws.
This is the reply to people, including me, who think there needs to be some kind of investigatory commission. Taken at his word, he's saying: Congress can do the investigating, the courts (and my Department of Justice) can prosecute. In theory, this works out well. A new president moves ahead; the System provides accountability. We'll see.
Argumentative / explanatory crux of the speech to the right:
I do know with certainty that we can defeat al Qaeda. Because the
terrorists can only succeed if they swell their ranks and alienate
America from our allies, and they will never be able to do that if we
stay true to who we are.
This has been, from the start, the central indictment of the Bush-Cheney approach to al Qaeda. Anything-goes tactics may or may not win battles, but they certainly lose wars. Dick Cheney's speech, cut off by BBC about ten minutes in, is ineffective not just because of its anger/contempt but also because what is billed as a response is in fact one cycle late, simply re-stating the claims Obama went out of his way to rebut (rather that keeping up with the cycle by answering anything Obama said).
Subtle harpoon crux of the speech, in the last paragraph:
We will not be safe if we see national security as a wedge that divides
America - it can and must be a cause that unites us as one people, as
one nation. We have done so before in times that were more perilous
than ours.
The entirety of the Bush-Cheney approach rested on the assumption that there had never been a threat as great as the one demonstrated by 9/11. Condi Rice said this explicitly, in her disastrous (and, in a just world, career-damaging) "al Qaeda was more dangerous than the Nazis" comment at Stanford. The parts of Cheney's speech I saw today, and everything we know about Bush's decisions and statements in office, assumed without argument that they faced choices between due-process and national security more painful than those that George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, or FDR wrestled with. A reminder that others have faced difficult choices and dire threats is useful for judging our response and placing it in the long context of American values that Obama repeatedly emphasized.
May 14, 2009
The CIA vs. Sen. Bob Graham: how to keep score at home
It's easy! If the CIA says one thing and former Sen. Graham says another, then the CIA is lying. Or, "in error," if you prefer.
(Background here and here, in which Graham says that some of the briefings in which he was allegedly filled in about waterboarding and related techniques never occurred. This matters, because the CIA's claims are part of the same argument that Nancy Pelosi and other Democrats in Congress had known about and acquiesced to waterboarding all the way along.)
Part of the payoff of reaching age 72 and having spent 38 years in public office, as Graham has, is that people have had a chance to judge your reputation. Graham has a general reputation for honesty. In my eyes he has a specific reputation for very good judgment: he was one of a handful of Senators actually to read the full classified intelligence report about the "threats" posed by Saddam Hussein. On the basis of reading it, despite a career as a conservative/centrist Democrat, he voted against the war and fervently urged his colleagues to do the same. "Blood is going to be on your hands," he warned those who voted yes.
More relevant in this case, Graham also has a specific reputation for keeping detailed daily records of people he met and things they said. He's sometimes been mocked for this compulsive practice, but he's never been doubted about the completeness or accuracy of what he compiles. (In the fine print of those records would be an indication that I had interviewed him about Iraq war policy while he was in the Senate and recently spent time with him when he was on this side of the world.)
So if he says he never got the briefing, he didn't. And if the CIA or anyone acting on its behalf challenges him, they are stupid and incompetent as well as being untrustworthy. This doesn't prove that the accounts of briefing Pelosi are also inaccurate. But it shifts the burden of proof.
May 4, 2009
More on the F-22, the F-35, and big expensive airplanes
The Atlantic has been your one-stop site for all aspects of the "F-22 question" -- the decision on whether to buy more copies of the Air Force's latest fighter plane. Mark Bowden's article in the magazine here; various perspective from me here, here, and here; SecDef Robert Gates's rationale in calling off purchases discussed here and here.
Apart from the F-22, the other fighter in gestation over the past decade has been the "Joint Strike Fighter," known as the F-35, shown here in vertical take-off mode for use by the Marine Corps. (Photo via Discovery channel). It is also designed to take off and land "normally," from a runway, for the Air Force version, and a from an aircraft carrier deck for the Navy's.
The case for this airplane (discussed at length in this article back in 2002) was that it would avoid the cost and complexity problems that plagued the F-22. The case against it, as presented in a recent document by the legendary military analyst and designer Pierre Sprey and Winslow Wheeler of America's Defense Meltdown, is that it too has turned into an example of those very same disorders. Their article about the two airplanes, "What 'Sweeping Reforms' in DOD?", takes a skeptical view of Sec. Gates's current procurement reforms and is available here. Worth reading not just about these aircraft but for the overall approach to defense spending.
April 16, 2009
More on Robert Gates's rationale
I mentioned last week Robert Gates's remarkably lucid argument for why the Air Force should stop most future purchases of the wonderful-if-we-could-afford-it-but-we-can't F-22 fighter plane.
Yesterday, he went to the Air War College, at Maxwell AFB in Alabama, to lay out the rationale for thinking about the F-22 and defense planning in general. Why "go to the war colleges to discuss this topic?" Gates asked rhetorically in the speech. Because "these recommendations are less about budget numbers than they are about how the U.S. military thinks about and prepares for the future."
If you're interested in such thinking and preparation, the speech is very much worth reading. It includes passages like the following, which to put it mildly are not what we've mainly heard from Secretaries of Defense over the decades (emphasis added):
Another important thing I looked at was whether modernization programs, in particular ground modernization programs, had incorporated the operational and combat experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem with the Army's Future Combat Systems vehicles was that a program designed nine years ago did not adequately reflect the lessons of close-quarter combat and improvised explosive devices that have taken a fearsome toll on our troops and their vehicles in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan.
Finally, I concluded we need to shift away from the 99 percent "exquisite" service-centric platforms that are so costly and complex that they take forever to build and only then in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change, and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget, and in significant numbers. As Stalin once said, "Quantity has a quality all of its own."
Does this mean that everything Gates proposes is right, that the defense budget has been pared to the essentials, and that all systemic problems have been solved? Of course not. The best single starting point for the necessary ongoing critique is the venerable "Defense and the National Interest" site here, or the book America's Defense Meltdown which I have so often touted, now on sale here.
But Gates in this speech (and some previous ones) does the very things I found admirable in Barack Obama's recent long-form economic presentation. He treats the audience like adults, he fairly presents opposing viewpoints, and he explains why he nonetheless considers the path he's on the most sensible one. All in all, he sounds like a man who makes his own decisions on the basis of evidence and logic -- and who presents issues as if he expects the public to do the same. That's worth noticing.
Update: For an extensive (and very supportive) parsing of the intellectual and argumentative structure of Obama's economic speech, see this entry at XPostFactoid.
April 15, 2009
Seatmates on a plane: Iraq report
From a long-time friend of mine, a report of his latest domestic airline flight:
Flew from XXX to XXX seated next to a career Army sgt headed to Iraq after R&R on 3rd tour. Fascinating conversation - and I realized that being seated next to Iraq-bound or -returning soldiers is commonplace on domestic air travel these days...
Gratifying to me was his saying that the troops really do feel appreciated and supported by the public, and can distinguish criticism of the war from criticism of the men and women in uniform (unlike in Vietnam days). None of the rest was gratifying at all:
• Surge has "worked" because Iraqis who just want to start killing one another again are biding their time. Après nous, le deluge. • No one could comprehend the waste of money in US expenditures in Iraq. • IEDs have become infinitely more sophisticated, very high tech now, and can penetrate all but one type of US vehicle. Suicide bombers can penetrate anything they want. • When an IED blows up a vehicle in a convoy, and you are two vehicles away in the same convoy, the force of the explosion is so violent you are thrown against the interior of your vehicle, you are temporarily deafened, etc. • Troop morale is high because they sense they are going home, most of them. But there is no way US can be out in five years or even ten without leaving too much equipment behind. • Although troop morale is high, they universally hate George W. Bush now. • Afghanistan is much more difficult than Iraq just on the basis of terrain alone. What we have in the way of tools and weapons is far better suited to Iraq than to Afghanistan.
It was poignant his describing the "huge" increases in pay resulting from Stop-Loss, plus Congress's efforts to help: $500 a month. To him, this is a really big sum, "on top of the extra $1000 per month we already get for being in combat."
Somehow additionally poignant on income tax day.
April 9, 2009
Bomb security: Israel v China
After seeing yesterday's picture of the "Suspect Bomb Container" in the Beijing Metro (previously here), reader Alex wrote:
In Israel there are thousands of explosion containers, but they are just holes in the ground, roughly one foot deep, lined with some metallic or plastic sheet. The Hebrew name is "bor bitahon" (you'd pronounce it "Bawr Bee-tuh-HONE") literally "security hole".
The logic would be that the good Earth will do the job of containing a significant proportion of the impact, with people feeling just a tremor. (A Chinese metal box could be blown to dangerous flying smithereens if the explosion is loud enough.)
The Israeli version is also cheaper if you must deploy it everywhere, including schools, malls, streets, parks, etc.
Probably the other important difference is that Israel has a serious bomb threat to worry about and so can't just fool around with "security theater."
April 8, 2009
What is this?? (SWAT team in the subway dept)
8:10 am, April 8, Dongdan 东单 metro station in Beijing: at the exit turnstiles, three black-uniformed troops, with "SWAT" written across their backs in English, holding big, genuine automatic weapons. Considerately, they pointed their rifles at the ground.
??
I'm used to rent-a-cop style Metro security officers; I'm used to PLA soldiers standing guard around the embassies; I'm used to various uniformed but feckless traffic-"control" agents; I'm used to policemen listening patiently as the antagonists in a fender-bender grow hoarse yelling at each other. But actual soldiers with machine guns? What is this? I thought a photo would be ill-advised.
On the other hand, and still on the security theme, Kevin Miller, of the University of Michigan, submits a photo of another of the mystery bomb-disposal containers I mentioned recently. Conveniently, his had a label in English.
It's not wholly legible in that shot, but the label says "Suspect Bomb Container." Even gives a url, www.jwgk.com, with lots of interesting info in Chinese and, to a limited degree, in English:
Now I feel better informed. Though I confess I still don't understand what practical purpose these might serve. As another correspondent pointed out, when he felt daring enough to try to crank one open -- as if to stow a suspected bomb -- it took minutes and minutes to do so. Maybe it's part of the economic stimulus plan. We've seen similar "homeland security" efforts in the US.
April 6, 2009
Words I never thought I'd hear from a Secretary of Defense
It is important to remember that every defense dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk - or, in effect, to "run up the score" in a capability where the United States is already dominant - is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.
Emphasis mine; sentiments his. This has obvious bearing, as Gates made clear, on whether it is worth "running up the score" in an area of current U.S. dominance by buying more F-22s, among other systems. (Previously on the F-22 here and here.) More later on the details and implications of Gates's budget, and whether he'll be systematic in applying the rationale he has laid out. For the moment, the simple logic of his statement is worth noting. As is the sense of shock at hearing something so logical as part of a budget presentation. ___ * Update: I see that Fred Kaplan is already on the case.
Last summer, Mr. Sane Thinking About All Things Security Related, Bruce Schneier, offered this perspective on electronic attacks originating in China. His view rings completely true to what I have seen of Chinese tech culture. Highlights:
These hacker groups seem not to be working for the Chinese government. They don't seem to be coordinated by the Chinese military. They're basically young, male, patriotic Chinese citizens, trying to demonstrate that they're just as good as everyone else. As well as the American networks the media likes to talk about, their targets also include pro-Tibet, pro-Taiwan, Falun Gong and pro-Uyghur sites.
The hackers are in this for two reasons: fame and glory, and an attempt to make a living. The fame and glory comes from their nationalistic goals. Some of these hackers are heroes in China....And the money comes from several sources. The groups sell owned computers, malware services, and data they steal on the black market. They sell hacker tools and videos to others wanting to play. They even sell T-shirts, hats and other merchandise on their Web sites.
Schneier points out that the probably non-governmental origin of this threat should moderate fear of a concentrated Chinese military plot -- but doesn't make the objective situation any better:
If anything, the fact that these groups aren't being run by the Chinese government makes the problem worse. Without central political coordination, they're likely to take more risks, do more stupid things and generally ignore the political fallout of their actions.
Schneier also has an update on the current controversy at his main site. For the strongest albeit circumstantial argument that the government or military might have been involved, see this post on Ars Technica. Its main point is that the list of sites known to have been attacked seems more selective and strategically chosen than one would suspect from a bunch of hackers. That's possible. But for now, the evidence still seems to me to support the hacker hypothesis. (Also: this site from the US Air Force's Air University has a number of useful links about US and foreign approaches to electronic info-warfare.)
March 21, 2009
What if the Israelis bomb Iran?
Watching Barack Obama's address to the Iranian public from outside the United States, though obviously not from inside Iran, I don't share Andrew Sullivan's concern that it will come off as patronizing. Instead I think it will seem, for those able to watch, startlingly and disarmingly respectful. After all, this is the President of the United States, not denouncing or lecturing an "enemy" audience but addressing them in friendly and supportive terms. Therefore I think it is part of a shrewd long-term play for rapprochement with an Iranian public that by all reports is potentially far more pro-Western than its current zealot leadership. Of course the same people who disagreed with Obama in 2002 about the wisdom of invading Iraq are certain to denounce him now for being too soft.
But clearly this approach does not solve the short-term problem of curbing the Iranian leadership's nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, and for fuller discussion another time, no other approach immediately solves that problem either. For now it is worth considering this extensive analysis from CSIS, by the indefatigable Anthony Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, of the ever-tempting "Osirak" option: allowing / encouraging / condoning / watching Israeli warplanes as they attack nuclear facilities in Iran.
The report is more than 100 pages long and tries to assess the feasibility of an attack from every angle. (A 2006 assessment by Cordesman of all options for dealing with Iran is here. The results of a 2004 Atlantic-sponsored "war game" involving Iran are here.) In its examination of second- and third- order effects, it strongly reminds me of the reports I read and wrote about in 2002, emphasizing that the conquest of Iraq was likely to be far more complex, costly, and likely to backfire than its boosters assumed. Many of the same boosters are again willing to assume away the practicalities in urging a military showdown with Iran.
After the jump, a few of the summary points. But you should look at the whole report. ___
A few days ago I said that I greatly enjoyed my colleague Mark Bowden's article about fighter aces but disagreed with his implication that the F-22 was the way to go for the Air Force or the country.
I have heard from many readers since then -- a few supporting the F-22, most against it. I'll start here with one representative "pro" comment. After the jump, a number of the meatier anti-F-22 arguments.
To be clear about a potentially awkward intramural point: although I disagree with Mark's conclusion, I am, as I said the first time, grateful for his engrossing article itself and for the opportunity it's created to air a range of opinion about a very important upcoming choice. He also has been extremely (and typically) mensch-like about the debate that his piece has inspired. ____
Pro comment -- rather, anti-anti -- from someone whose email address identifies him as an employee of a major defense contractor:
Excuse me, but you seem to be caught up in the propaganda of the F-15 mafia. The F-15 mafia and others have successfully reduced the numbers of F-22 production to the point where economies of scale are no longer possible.* Unfortunately, those who really know the issues and the data, are not going to engage in a debate, because the result is to trash our country and our capability. Because of freedom of speech, you are allowed too participate in a debate that has not helped our country. No complex aircraft is without problems, but maintainers have never had an aircraft which provided so much capability on day one...
The per unit cost isn't even the whole picture, the total life cycle cost is. And cost is relative. Do you have the numbers for all alternatives? Anyway, you don't have the numbers, no one in the unclassifed media does.
* A major "anti" argument, as originally laid out by Chuck Spinney in 1991, was of course that economies of scale would never have been possible for this airplane, because the cost estimates used for the initial "buy-in" were implausibly low.
- About China and the US cooperating on environmental/climate issues:
Yesterday I mentioned this detailed and valuable report from the Asia Society and Pew. It turns out that Brookings has just done something similar. Summary here, with links to PDF versions in both English and Chinese. Transcript of event unveiling the report here. I haven't studied the report carefully, but anything in this vein has to be a plus.
- About Mark Bowden and the F-22:
Yesterday I said that I enjoyed Mark Bowden's current article but disagreed with its implied endorsement of the F-22 fighter plane. It turns out that Sam Roggeveen, of the Lowy Institute's "The Interpreter" site in Sydney, has already taken up this topic and gotten a reply from Mark. Roggeveen's initial critique here; Mark Bowden's response here. I should note that, like Roggeveen, I did a double-take at the sentence in the original article saying that at least five other countries were now flying planes that matched or bettered the F-15. For context on that point, it's worth looking here. Also, this Reuters story from three months ago talks about the real-world difficulties in maintaining the "stealth" systems for radar-evasion that are supposed to be one of the F-22's main virtues.
Let a thousand flowers bloom, Atlantic-style (F-22 dept)
My Atlantic colleague Mark Bowden has produced another of his riveting narratives in the new issue of the magazine. His article is about the former US Air Force fighter pilot who is among the last to have encountered -- and beaten -- enemy airplanes in action. As Bowden points out, American pilots rarely have a chance to demonstrate their prowess any more, because no one is crazy enough to challenge them.
As a narrative and portrait of fascinating characters, this story is great. But for the record, I disagree with its implication that if the US doesn't build more F-22 fighter planes, it will pay the price in pilots' blood. Mark's case for the plane is more sophisticated than what the Air Force has typically claimed. His story doesn't say that if we don't build the F-22 we can't defend the nation. He says it's a choice between paying the price for defense in money -- or in pilots' lives.
Perhaps. I'm glad Mark wrote the story, because what to do about the F-22 is one of the next big defense decisions the Obama Administration must make. But as you consider his argument, you might also consider some of the material below, which offers other ways to think about the trade-offs this airplane represents.
Extra reading possibilities:
- In "Uncle Sam Buys an Airplane," in the Atlantic in 2002, I described the genesis of the "Joint Strike Fighter," now known as the F-35. Its whole rationale was the fear that the F-22 would become so expensive that the U.S. would never be able to buy and field more than a tiny force. The F-35 has had problems of its own since then, and the contract officer at the center of my story has since been jailed for corruption on an unrelated matter, but the economic questions remain. (Excerpt after the jump.)
- In "F-22, Fact vs Fiction," published in 2000, the fighter pilot and aircraft designer Everest Riccioni assessed the F-22's abilities relative to the F-15's and other planes and argued that in the real circumstances of air combat, it would offer few advantages to pilots that would justify its costs -- and that the excessive cost of the airplane jeopardized pilots, since it meant too small a fighting force. The link above opens his paper as a Word document.
- in "Preying on the Taxpayer," published in 2006, the Project on Government Oversight analyzed budgetary and performance questions about the F-22.
- In the new book "America's Defense Meltdown" (described here, no longer available for free download but in bookstores shortly -- and ready now for Kindle) Pierre M. Sprey and Robert Dilger argue that the US could best guarantee air superiority by canceling further F-22 purchases and instead choosing a radically less expensive alternative, which they describe in detail. Excerpts after the jump.
- And just as a bonus, if you've ever wondered what it is like to sit in an F-15 during an hour-long aerial combat drill, well, wonder no longer.
Please do read Mark Bowden's article, which you'll enjoy. Read these others too. Discuss and decide. That's why we're here!
UPDATE: Please see followup posts here and here. ____
I believe I was the first person in the "general" press -- and if not, then among the first two or three* -- to notice that the one part of greater Washington DC that was obscured from view in Google Earth was not the CIA headquarters or the Pentagon or the White House itself, but rather... Dick Cheney's house, or as it is more formally called, the Naval Observatory grounds. Here's how the Vice Presidential compound looked on Google Earth until very recently.
Now, as several sources (eg here) have noted, the Vice President's official house is being treated like other sensitive structures in DC -- or Beijing or Moscow or Paris or Tokyo or Baghdad. That is: as worthy of protection on the ground, but not of being airbrushed out of recognition in a fashion worthy of the old Soviet era (or of today's "security theater"). I noticed this last night when checking neighborhood maps in Google Earth. It is by a steady accumulation of these small changes that we'll appreciate how much there is to undo after the past eight years. ____ * Maureen Dowd did a widely-cited column on the blurring in December, 2005. Earlier that year, in tech columns for the NYT's business section in April and then again in May, I noted the odd blurriness of Cheney's house. I say this just for the record -- and have moved the mention to a footnote in keeping with footnote-scale significance.
January 26, 2009
Security theater: now in improved, online version (updated x2)
Yesterday I mentioned the toy industry's patriotic attempt to build proper security consciousness into the kiddies. (I also like the detail that this was no doubt made in some factory in southern China, by workers who had yet another reason to marvel at the consumer tastes of their foreign customers. UPDATE: Who wudda thunk!? It turns out that Playmobil toys are mostly made in Europe, with only a few from China. Sorry for mistaken assumption.) Here, again, is the Playmobil item as offered on Amazon:
Thanks to many correspondents I learn that this item has been around for several years and has attracted a lot of customer reviews and comments. If you start with this one you'll get the idea. BONUS UPDATE: The last word that need ever be said about the Playmobil TSA set appears to have been said several years ago! By Daniel Solove here.
Also, and even more patriotic and heartening, I learn that there is an online Airport Security game! You play the role of a TSA screener, pulling prohibited items out of purses and backpacks -- and trying to keep up with changing lists of what's allowed and what's taboo.
Someday they'll put this stuff in museums about our era. (Thanks to Allen Knutson and Carl Malamud.)
Today's Security Theater update
Previously on the Security Theater concept here, here, here, and here, for starters.
1) From the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, or AOPA, a pro-small plane aviation lobbying group (of which I'm a member), indication that the Obama administration's general freeze on last-minute Bush regulations and diktats might stop implementation of one of the stupidest, least defensible, most purely theatric "security" measures, the creation of a permanent Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ, over Washington DC. Yes, the Guantanamo orders are more important. But this could be significant too.
2) Conference summary, with video and links, from Cato's conference just before the inauguration on "Shaping the Obama Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy." Wide-ranging, useful to hear as the Obama team considers what, if anything, is worth preserving from the Bush "global war on terror." Useful complementary essay here.
3) Yesterday I drive to DC National Airport for the first time in more than a year and see the same big neon sign I remember so unfondly from days gone by. Security Threat Level: Orange.
Really, what is the point of this? 99.9% of the people who look at it don't even see it any more, since it's just part of the "boy who cried wolf" ignorable background. Anyone who does think about it has to wonder: is there a threat to the entire country? Just to Washington? Is there new information? Is there anything different I'm supposed to do? Does this sign have any purpose other than to make me just a little bit more fearful and a little bit more accepting of anything done in the name of "security"?
Yes, there are serious ongoing genuine threats to the safety of people in this country and many others, and we need to support all shrewd, effective measures to deter them. But does it occur to no one in the government that we do terrorists' work for them by making our own population cower all the time, rather than to be brave in the face of danger? Taking his lead from President Reagan, President Obama can say: "Transportation Security Administration, Tear Down This Sign!"
4) Someone has finally seen how security theater can become part of our economic stimulus plan. Playmobil is offering new action toys:
I grew up playing with little toy Army men who refought Gettysburg and Okinawa. My kids grew up with Star Wars action figures. Isn't it heartwarming to think of today's kids growing up with toy TSA security screeners! (Thanks to Gavin Bradley for this tip.)
January 15, 2009
Year end pensees: more on security
OK, we're already 4% of the way into the new year of 2009. But there are still 10 or 11 days left in the current Chinese Year of the Earthen Rat, before we welcome the auspicious Year of the Golden Ox. So if I hurry I can get through my list of topics worthy of year end wrap-up. (Previously here, here, here and here.) This time, on security:
- Most important remaining symbolic change: getting rid of the abhorrently un-American, odiously Teutono/Soviet term "Homeland Security," and replacing it with something less Gestapo-sounding. Here is one suggestion: "Civil Security." The Integrative Center for [groan] Homeland Security at Texas A&M has a video on its site in which the director, David McIntyre, argues that "civil security" is both a better concept and a better name. Video is a little over seven minutes long, "civil society" discussion is in last minute and a half. Entire site worth inspecting.
- Latest evidence of the primacy of "security theater" over real security: this assessment of how many lives the U.S. can save and how much havoc it can prevent for each million dollars the TSA spends on air marshals -- versus using the money to harden cockpit doors or take other steps. About air marshals the study says:
An assessment of the Federal Air Marshal Service suggests that the annual cost is $180 million per life saved. This is greatly in excess of the regulatory safety goal of $1-$10 million per life saved. As such, the air marshal program would seem to fail a cost-benefit analysis.
More about TSA security theater on an ongoing basis from the Reason Foundation's Airport Policy and Security newsletter, from Bruce Schneier passim, and of course from the Atlantic's loci classici, here and here.
- Security theater takes a holiday in Beijing. Until just before the Olympics, there was no bag-check before you went into a subway station. Then airport-style bag-screening machines were installed at all the stations -- and six months later they are still there. They constitute an imperfect security shield, to put it mildly. Passengers themselves aren't checked at all, so you could get onto the subway with anything you wanted packed under a gigantic winter overcoat.(Picture below shows my standard Beijing winter attire, minus the mufflers, sweaters, big hat, long underwear, etc.)
Now, and heart-warmingly, the people running the system act as if they know it's just for show. Of the last 20 or so trips I've made on the subway, I've skipped putting my bag through the machine about half the times. Once it was because the security station was unattended; twice, because the person who was supposed to look at the x-ray screen was sleeping. The rest, because the attendants just waved me on or didn't give me a second glance. Everyone involved is acting as if this has become a nice public-employment project.
- My own personal act of (legal) Don't Tread on Me-ism, for when I move back to the US and resurrect my flying career. This article, by Dave Hirschman on the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) site, describes the change in the flying environment in Washington over these past seven years. Essentially it's become illegal for most anything except airliners or police helicopters to fly within about 30 miles of the capital - roughly as if cars and trucks could no longer operate anywhere in downtown DC. ( More here and here.) That's perfectly normal in China, where you practically never see flying craft except at big airports. For the US, it's a change. There is an exception, which involves going through Secret Service screening to obtain the right to fly as "close" to the seat of government as College Park, Maryland, whose very nice little historic airport is barely staying in business. As a little symbolic assertion of freedom, I'll go through the screening process when I get back.
(Further on pointless "security" measures involving small airplanes here, here, here, and here. For another time, full explanation of why these won't work.)
There is one more security theme that I'll also save for a separate post. It has to do with the potentially destructive and dangerous conception of "security" that President Bush harped on in his final press conference. Will try to do that while I can still refer to him as "the President" rather than "former President" GW Bush.
January 11, 2009
On Gaza, strategy, and tactics
Five days ago I mentioned that I did not know enough about Gaza to have a detailed or nuanced judgment about the immediate circumstances of the Israeli effort against Hamas.
But I have seen, read, reported, thought, and written enough over the years about the strategy-tactics tension in many realms, from politics to business to technology to war planning, to recognize a situation in which short-term tactical victories may lead to long-term strategic defeat. This is how the Gaza operation looked early on, and how it looks more starkly with every passing day. Gee, if only there were a popular saying that conveyed the idea that you could win many battles and still lose the war.
Now someone who knows a lot about the details and nuances of Middle East conflict has stated this concern in blunt and authoritative terms. I am referring of course to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, he of the unending flow of detailed papers on the military balance in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere. Two days ago he issued an analysis called "The War in Gaza: Tactical Gains, Strategic Defeat?" In light of his argument, the question-mark in the title seems superfluous, or merely polite:
The growing human tragedy in Gaza is steadily raising more serious
questions as to whether the kind of tactical gains that Israel now
reports are worth the suffering involved.... This raises a question that every Israeli and its supporters now needs
to ask. What is the strategic purpose behind the present fighting?
I won't quote further from his analysis, which is short enough to be read easily in its entirety and long enough to make a reasonable case. Please go see for yourself. But I will quote the way it ends:
As we have seen all too clearly from US
mistakes, any leader can take a tough stand and claim that tactical
gains are a meaningful victory. If this is all that Olmert, Livni, and
Barak have for an answer, then they have disgraced themselves and
damaged their country and their friends. If there is more, it is time
to make such goals public and demonstrate how they can be achieved.
January 6, 2009
On Gaza
Several of my Atlantic colleagues have explained why they are not writing more frequently about this ongoing war.
My explanation is simpler, and is the opposite of Jeffrey Goldberg's. He says, in effect, that he knows too much about the situation. I know too little. I spent the first weeks of the Iraq war in Haifa and Tel Aviv, mainly working on this article (about the Mohammed al-Dura case, which of course took place in Gaza), and I was at Camp David with Jimmy Carter's entourage when he brokered the Sadat-Begin agreements of 1978. But I understand enough about the politics of the Middle East to recognize that I don't understand enough.
The one relevant thing I do know concerns a repeated source of tragedy in foreign-policy decision making. That is the reluctance to ask, before irrevocable decisions, "And what happens then?" For instance: so we depose Saddam Hussein. What happens then? This question is all the harder to ask when the step in question feels so good. Crushing Saddam. Or, punishing Hamas.
I can imagine the Gaza ground war "working" from Israel's perspective in the short term. The obvious question is, What happens then? I find it very difficult to imagine a sequence of events that leaves Israel -- or anyone -- better off one year from now, or ten.
If I thought the people making Israel's choices were stupid, I could tell myself that they hadn't properly weighed the consequences. But I don't think they're stupid. Instead I think that, like the people who rushed the U.S. into war in Iraq, they are reckless and unwise and will therefore hurt their country. Along with hurting a lot of others.
December 22, 2008
Year-end pensees #2: security
Despite the best efforts of Jeffrey Goldberg in his Atlantic article last month, despite my varied efforts in articles like this and this and this, despite the books by John Mueller and others, despite the precocious academic papers of Benjamin H. Friedman -- formerly of MIT, now of Cato, not the economist Benjamin Friedman of Harvard -- we end 2008 with the rituals of "security theater" still enshrined in American life.
As Jeff Goldberg is the latest (and most amusing) to demonstrate, security routines like those of the TSA gum up travel and cost countless billions in salary, wasted time, and general hassle (not to mention the thrown-away bottled water and cigarette lighters!) without adding much that would thwart a serious terrorist.
My heart sank when I read recently about a truly idiotic last-minute Bush Administration step to lock in security theater. This is converting the "Air Defense Identification Zone," which had been "temporarily" in effect in the skies of the Mid-Atlantic since soon after 9/11, to a permanent federal regulation. (Splenetic background from me, here and here. News of the conversion to permanent status here.) Sigh. And commercial airports in the U.S. still ring with the ignored-by-all announcements warning that the "threat level" is "elevated."
If you haven't spent much time out of the country recently, it may be hard to convey how fraidy-cat all this ritual makes the US seem. Yes, the 9/11 attacks were a disaster of historic proportions. Yes, some group, somewhere, will probably manage to attack the United States again. But many, many societies around the world face an ongoing risk of attack. Life is dangerous. Over the long run, we judge societies by how they bear up under such threats (and, of course, what they do to contain them.) Compared with the Brits, the Indians, not to mention the Israelis and I bet also the Iraqis, our security theater makes us look like chickens. Reclaiming Gary Cooper, not Chicken Little, as our national icon is part of what I argued here.
But given the way politics works, security theater is a ratchet. If a public figure dares suggest reducing some for-show "protective" measure, then when an attack occurs -- as it will, someday, in a country this large and open -- the politician will be in trouble. So it's easy to add extra "safeguards"; almost impossible to remove them.
Except, perhaps, with the general housecleaning that is possible when Administrations change. Here is one very modest place to start. Please, Gov. Janet Napolitano -- please, please, please, for the love of God -- change the name of the department you have been nominated to head. "Department of Homeland Security" is not a term a real American would use. "Homeland" is something that Germans of the 1930s would say. Or Soviet Russians of the 1950s. Not Yanks. "Domestic Security" is dull but not Orwellian. Try that, or something similar.
For more ideas, I hope that everyone who can possibly be in Washington on Jan 12-13, including Napolitano, will attend this conference, at Cato, about rational and non-hysteric ways to keep America secure. (Extra background here.) A new Administration has a chance for a new start.
December 9, 2008
More on the "Shinseki beret"
Results from the vast blog-reading public: 100-to-1 in favor of Gen. Eric Shinseki's conduct before and after the Iraq war. (Background here and here.) 100-to-1 in opposition to his role as "the genius who made Army troops wear the beret." (Background here.)
(Image from ad at RangerJoes.com, the online shop for "Military and Law Enforcement Gear.")
To give fair voice to the one percent not complaining about the beret, I quote reader Frank Logan:
I wish I knew who decided we should wear the Castro style hats we wore in the '60's Army so I could hate him the way today's troops apparently hate Shinseki. It's probably like hating the food in the mess which is actually pretty good.
Here endeth my Shinseki-and-beret discussion.
December 7, 2008
Vox militis* on Shinseki
I am grateful for a flood of mail from active-duty and retired military people, and their families, expressing admiration and excitement about Barack Obama's choice of Eric Shinseki as his Secretary of Veterans Affairs. (On the merits and symbolism of the choice, here; on the politics, here.)
Below, from reader Larry Senechal of Seattle, a representative note of appreciation. After the jump, from a currently-serving Army officer, a representative complaint -- which may surprise many people outside the military.
First, the appreciation:
I'm an old former Marine, infantry type.
General Shinseki is old school General Officer corps,
unlike many Generals and senior officers who go through the revolving
door to become Defense contractor lobbyists, media analysts and Defense
contractor employees. It seems when this happens "Duty, Honor,
Country" are secondary to making money. In my opinion after 37 years
of service to this country, this doesn't seem appropriate payback to a country
who gave them so much and continues to do so with their OWN legacy costs to the
American taxpayer. The stories of just how corrosive this has been on the
military services and our Defense policy abound and have yet to be dealt with
effectively.
My father was a retired senior Army Officer as was my
father-in-law and both highly decorated infantry commanders. My dad often
lamented the growing "revolving" door and the poor leadership of many
in the General Corps and the dileterious effect it was having on the Army. When
the military first started using bonuses during the Clinton years to keep
captains and majors in the service, he observed that the retention problem said
less about the attractiveness of the private sector and more about the quality
of senior leadership who seemed more committed to their careers and less to the
men they commanded. I didn't fully appreciate and understand his remark at the
time. I now do after the last eight years.
Imagine my surprise when I read an article at MSNBC quoting
Shinseki stating,....""You must love
those you lead before you can be an effective leader," he said. "You
can certainly command without that sense of commitment, but you cannot lead
without it. And without leadership, command is a hollow experience, a vacuum often
filled with mistrust and arrogance."
One of the truly nauseating moments in the run-up to the Iraq war was the humiliating public rebuke that Paul Wolfowitz, then Donald Rumsfeld's #2 at the Pentagon, delivered to Eric Shinseki, then a four-star general serving as Army chief of staff.
Shinseki, a wounded combat veteran of Vietnam, was by career and reputation a cautious, methodical person. Those who criticized his performance as Army chief mainly complained that he was too traditional and non-innovative in his approach. Thus, he was constantly at odds with Rumsfeld's crew, who viewed him as a passive-aggressive, fuddy-duddy obstacle to doing things in their new lean-and-mean way.
The showdown came just before the war began. Shinseki, who had direct experience with land warfare (in Vietnam) and post-combat occupation (in the Balkans), was urging that the U.S. go in with a force large enough to ensure that it could maintain order and genuinely control Iraq's sizable territory and potentially fractious society after it ousted Saddam. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz hated this whole idea.
After the jump, a passage from my Atlantic article and subsequent book, both called Blind into Baghdad, describing what happened next. I think this also explains why it is so satisfying and right that Barack Obama will (reportedly) name Shinseki to his Cabinet as the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
(Shinseki after his retirement, at a museum in his honor in Hawaii. Photo from a profile of him at this official Army web site.)
Here's one other point that is not as widely known as Rumfeld's and Wolfowitz's bullying of Shinseki: Despite being unfairly treated, despite being 100% vindicated by subsequent events, Shinseki kept his grievances entirely to himself. Although my book contains accounts of Shinseki's inside arguents with Rumsfeld et al, and his discussions with his own staff, zero of that information came from Shinseki.
I made a complete nuisance of myself requesting an interview, or a phone conversation, or an email exchange, or even some "you're getting warmer" guidance from him. Nothing doing, in any way. (I did track him down at an ROTC commissioning ceremony where he was speaking; he greeted me politely, but that was it.) I am confident in the accounts I presented, which came from a variety of first-hand participants; but Shinseki, who could have had a lucrative career on the talk show/lecture circuit giving "I told you so" presentations, has not indulged that taste at all.
So congratulations to Eric Shinseki, who has stoically served his country for decades and was wounded in that cause, in several senses, on this new honor -- and on the responsibility to help others who have served. Congratulations, too, that a Japanese-American patriot from Hawaii should receive this news on December 7. And not just congratulations but wonderment at the Obama team's deftness in the symbolism and substance of this choice.
Details of Shinseki-Wolfowitz showdown after the jump. _________
... you can meet the people responsible for the book that I keep on lauding, America's Defense Meltdown -- plus get a free copy of the book, by coming to a book-launch reception. You have to pay for your own beer, but it's at a place I have been many times and whose beer quality I can vouch for.
Details: Wednesday, December 3, 6pm, at the Officers' Club at Fort Myer, across the river from downtown Washington in Rosslyn, Va. This same site has for several decades been the location for weekly beer sessions among the defense-reform community that originally featured the famous, late Col. John Boyd. Further info about the event, including instructions for RSVPs, at the Center for Defense Information site here. I'd be there if I weren't on the other side of the world. Have a beer and get a book for me.
November 25, 2008
A little Thanksgiving holiday reading
When you're in a tryptophan - induced daze and looking for stimulants of the most wholesome and enjoyable sort, the place to start is of course with the latest great issue of The Atlantic.
After that, two suggestions:
1) The Global Trends 2025 report from the National Intelligence Council. (Intro page here; 8MB pdf file of whole report for free download here.) Projections of how the world will look 17 years into the future are by their nature preposterous. One conducted in 1991, looking toward the present day, would have found it hard to imagine the defeat of George H. W. Bush (then on the top of the world politically) and the subsequent Clinton and Bush II and possible Clinton II eras that made possible; the tech induced stock boom, and tech bust, and second boom, and second bust; the current situation of both China and Russia, then mere glimmers of what they are today; the resonance of the names bin Laden and Guantanamo. And... a whole lot more.
Still, for what it is, this forecast is sensible and provocative. It has gotten a lot of ink as a forecast of US "decline," but it is more interesting and less blatant than that. I disagree with a lot of it but am glad to have had the occasion to think through its arguments. And 17 years from now, we can see how it stands up.
2) I can't say this oftenenough: seriously, anybody who presumes to hold an opinion on America's defense needs, defense spending, and long term military strategy really has to read "America's Defense Meltdown," available in free 2MB pdf download here. (More words than the NCI report above; fewer graphics.)
This report has facts; it has figures; it has history; it has to-do lists for the next administration; it has things you might expect and things you don't.
From what you might expect, an introductory passage about what's happened to our military establishment:
Our equipment is the most sophisticated and effective in the world. We easily whipped one of the largest armies in the Middle East, not once but twice, and we have now clearly mastered a once difficult and ugly situation in Iraq. Success in Afghanistan will not be far away, once we devote the proper resources there. Those who take comfort in the last three sentences are the people who need to read and consider the contents of this book the most. Reflect on the following:
• America's defense budget is now larger in inflation adjusted dollars than at any point since the end of World War II, and yet our Army has fewer combat brigades than at any point in that period, our Navy has fewer combat ships and the Air Force has fewer combat aircraft. Our major equipment inventories for these major forces are older on average than at any point since 1946; in some cases they are at all-time historical highs in average age. [etc etc]
For a sample of something you might not expect, the following, from probably the most right-wing of all the authors in the book -- a man whose cubicle wall, in the Senate office building where he worked, was adorned with a poster of Mussolini when I met him in the early 1980s. He is discussing the overall balance between the US Navy and the Russian and Chinese fleets -- especially the looming Chinese "menace" that drives the need for new US ships:
Overwhelming any comparison of fleets is the fact that war with either Russia or China would represent a catastrophic failure of American strategy. Such wars would be disastrous for all parties, regardless of their outcomes. In a world where the most important strategic reality is a non-Marxist "withering away of the state," the United States needs both Russia and China to be strong, successful states. They need the United States to be the same. Defeat of any of the three global powers by another would likely yield a new, vast, stateless region, which is to say a great victory for the forces of the Fourth Generation. No American armed service should be designed for wars our most vital interest dictates we not fight.
Read these between football games over the weekend. You won't be sorry. And consider sending copies of #2, especially, to the Obama household for Christmas.
A Chinese fighter plane! At least, a 1:48 scale model of one, the domestically-produced 歼-10, or J-10, courtesy of a friend at AVIC, China's giant aerospace company. Click for larger, including a glimpse of the teeny blue-suited model pilot inside:
And just down the street, at the main AVIC building, the full-sized J-10 itself, in a static display that I watched workers prepare shortly before the Olympics:
No larger theme for the moment; I just like having the model, which is made of metal rather than plastic and feels surprisingly sturdy.
November 13, 2008
More about "America's Defense Meltdown" (Updated)
This is the book I mentioned yesterday, a very useful overview of the issues, challenges, constraints, and possibilities for America's defense policy. Two tech-related positive developments concerning this book.
- Hardcovers of the book will be available sometime soon. But if you would like to start reading it today, you can get an electronic copy, free, by requesting one from Winslow Wheeler, the book's editor. He has placed his email address on the Center for Defense Information web site, and (with his permission) I also give it here: WinslowWheeler@msn.com . UPDATE: free PDF download now available directly via this link.
- If, in addition to being interested in a sustainable defense policy for America, you use a Kindle, you will find that the emailed PDF version formats itself well for Kindle reading. (Thanks to Dave Finton on this point. For info and links about how to view .DOC and .PDF files on a Kindle, check here.)
November 12, 2008
Back to business: must-read new book on defense
At its site here, the Center for Defense Information announces the imminent release of its new book "America's Defense Meltdown." Really this is a guide on how to think about, pay for, reconfigure, equip, deploy, withdraw, modernize, simplify, support, strengthen, lead, motivate, inspire, and in all other ways improve America's military establishment.
I hardly need to mention why such a book is useful, at a time when the United States and its new Administration must figure out how to manage whatever comes next in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ongoing challenge of possible terrorism, America's new financial realities, and on down a very long list.
What is most remarkable about the book is the array of authors who have joined to produce this anthologized volume. If I started listing a few, I would have to name them all (PDF of full list here.) They include the closest colleagues and collaborators of the late Air Force colonel John Boyd plus leading defense analysts and practitioners of the next generation. They have amply earned the right to be listened to. What I said in a blurb on the book's jacket* is, if anything, not enthusiastic enough:
The talent, judgment, and insight collected in this book are phenomenal. Over the last generation, the authors have been more right, more often, about more issues of crucial importance to American security than any other group I can think of. It is a tremendous benefit to have their views collected in one place and concentrated on the next big choices facing a new Administration. This really is a book that every serious-minded citizen should read.
For more about the book, from one of its organizers, Chet Richards, see this. Check it out.
____
* On blurbs: I have a bias in favor of giving blurbs for books, because in my experience most books deserve a better chance and a broader audience than they're likely to receive. Obviously there are exceptions. But I try to be very precise about the aspects of a book I compliment and the kinds of readers I recommend it to. Thus this comment really does reflect my respect for the authors and their collective contribution.
October 29, 2008
A modest step against "security theater" -- in Beijing!
As recently mentioned here, with links to many other articles and posts, the phenomenon of "security theater" that both Jeff Goldberg and I have discussed in Atlantic articles is an unfortunate world-wide trend.
Security theater is typified by make believe measures that make it seem as if authorities are "doing something" about security but that may have little connection to the threats that are most serious or the ways they might be thwarted. In the old days, an example would be the "have these bags been in your possession?..." catechism at airport check-in counters. These days, the reflexive demand to "show ID" before going into buildings or the ignored-by-all recordings in US airports that begin, "This is a security announcement. The threat level is elevated.."
The other classic trait of worldwide security theater is the ratchet-like irreversibility of the process. For instance, as mentioned in my earlier post, some of the "special Olympic" security precautions instituted this summer in Beijing show no sign of ever going away. (Like bag screening for all subway passengers.) There is a bureaucratic/political explanation for this, which is that no one is likely to be blamed for the cost or inconvenience of such measures, whereas any public official can easily imagine the resulting witch hunt if a "precaution" were removed and... something went wrong.
But here's an exception! A few hours ago, I arrived at the new international terminal at Beijing Capital airport -- the one with the delightful airport identifier PEK -- and found myself simply able to walk in from the sidewalk through the main entrance door. None of the one-by-one machine scanning of bags, wiping them for explosive residue, or sniffing by bomb-dogs that had caused long lines in the entry corridors all this summer. Those practices started about a month before the Olympics, but some time recently someone apparently was willing to take the risk of calling them off. Worth noticing.
October 19, 2008
Three colleagues
Often I make some explanatory or background comment about my own article in each new issue of the Atlantic. But I don't like to say much about other articles, because on the merits I'd end up saying: Hey, read them all, they're all great! Usually, and especially in this issue, they are.
For special reasons I want to mention three current items by my colleagues.
1) Jeffrey Goldberg's hilarious-but-serious takedown of the TSA. The wasteful spectacle of "security theater" has been on my mind for a long time, as the folly of this system was evident from pretty near the start. Very soon after 9/11, the only two airline-security measures that really matter -- fortified cockpit doors, and the vigilance of a flying public that now knows what a hijacking can mean -- were in place. Since then we've erected an edifice that imposes a huge indirect cost on the traveling public while (as Jeff points out in the article) doing very little to discourage serious terrorist threats. Two years ago in the Atlantic, I quoted John Mueller, author of Overblown, to similar effect:
The widely held view among security experts is that this airport
spending is largely for show. Strengthened cockpit doors and a flying
public that knows what happened on 9/11 mean that commercial airliners
are highly unlikely to be used again as targeted flying bombs. "The
inspection process is mostly security theater, to make people feel safe
about flying," says John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State
and the author of a forthcoming book about the security-industrial
complex.
But there seems to be a ratchet effect in "security theater" projects. Once a "safeguard" is adopted, no one dares propose taking it down. Here in Beijing, X-ray screening for all handbags, briefcases, and other parcels taken onto the subway was introduced as a special Olympic-security measure last July. The games are gone, but the screeners (and the long lines of people waiting in front of them) are still there. If logic and evidence had any power to change a system, Jeff Goldberg's article would have some effect.
2) Barbara Wallraff, in the latest entry in her new Atlantic blog, asks for a word to describe people whose street etiquette takes a certain form. My nominee is "the people of Beijing and Shanghai." I was actually planning to write something about the mysterious difference between Chinese and Japanese walking-styles on the street. (Pedestrians in Tokyo, in general, act as if they're aware that ten million other people need to fit onto the same streets, and make themselves small. Pedestrians in Shanghai or Beijing, in the same overgeneralization, act as if they're the only ones walking and make themselves big.) Details, theory, evidence, and photos for another time.
3) Andrew Sullivan, in this item, has very nice and accurate things to say about the Atlantic's elegant redesign, and about the virtues of actually subscribing to the magazine. He is right on all counts -- and also has a very polished and non-bloggish essay about blogs in this issue. As for subscribing, in the short term the physical magazine really is an important complement to the (ever more important) web site, in that it can combine photos, art, and text in a way not matched on screen. I feel this difference very keenly overseas, where I get print issues five or six weeks late. It's simply different to read a magazine like this on a designed page. And in the long run, this is part of how businesses like ours survive.
September 28, 2008
A military perspective on strategy and tactics
Yesterday I mentioned the irony of John McCain's complaining that Barack Obama "didn't understand" the difference between strategy and tactics, given that the Obama campaign seemed guided by a long-term strategy leading to November 4 while McCain was fighting day by day tactical battles.
After the jump, an email just in from Gerald A. Lechliter, a career U.S. Army officer, with some interesting elaborations on this point. I'll use this opportunity to restate a procedural note:
If you send me a message via the "email JF" button on this site, I will assume that I can use some or all of the contents of your message in subsequent posts unless you say otherwise, but that I should not use your name or other identifying details unless you explicitly say that is OK. [Original version of this post did not include G. Lechliter's name, but I got a subsequent message from him OK'ing its use.]
For instance, I'd remove parts of a message that said "I am a 67-year old man from Wyoming currently living at the U.S. Naval Observatory but contemplating a relocation next January" but might use the parts that said, "I have had several heart-bypass operations, and I've begun to reflect on how they might change someone's personality..."
That is a fake email. After the jump, a real one about strategy and tactics. ________
Two sophisticated and well-worth-reading documents on national security
1) From Bruce Schneier, renowned and sensible expert on taking terrorist threats seriously without overreacting and defeating ourselves in the process, on exactly which aspects of the Chinese "hacker" menace are worrisome, and which ones aren't.
Executive summary: these hackers aren't controlled by the Chinese government or military and basically are sharp, cocky young men showing off their technical skills. "The hackers are in this for two reasons: fame and glory, and an attempt to make a living." That is reassuring in some ways and not in others. But the essay should be read in full. (Thanks to Edward Goldstick for tip.)
2) From one Barack Obama, on the mixture of military strength, non-military influence, assertiveness, and restraint that will advance American interests in this era of ongoing terror threats, ongoing Iraq and Afghanistan combat, financial and economic chaos, resource and energy crises, rise of China, unruliness of Russia, and so on. Full text and some video here.
Executive summary: any speech that begins and ends with allusions to George C. Marshall's vision 60 years ago is quoting the right authority but setting a high standard for itself. This is a speech rather than a whole implemented years-long program, in contrast to the great Marshall's achievement. But as a speech it stands up very well and deserves to be read and absorbed in toto rather than relying on news clips.
July 2, 2008
Article that most rings true from today's NYT
This one, by Jake Hooker, on the fallibilities and limits of the Chinese military, as evidenced by its response to the Sichuan earthquake.
This article should be introduced into the record at every Congressional hearing on the (alleged) looming military menace from the other side of the Pacific.
Previously on this theme here and here and passim.
June 2, 2008
Praising a neocon! (updated)
I am limited, to put it mildly, in my admiration for neocons and the blessings they have brought to America and the world.
But to give credit where it is due: just now on BBC's HARDtalk program, Robert Kagan -- he of the "Mars vs. Venus" description of virile America versus weakling Europe -- did an admirable job of handling the interviewer Stephen Sackur. Sackur's specialty has become the haughty-sounding "Surely it's preposterous to suggest.." school of bullying interrogation. Often this involves hopping around from theme to theme, the continuity provided mainly by the superior tone.
Kagan, who is now a McCain advisor, dealt with this act as well as I've seen done, calling Sackur out on each of the logical jumps. Bonus point to him for admitting (in roughly these words) that the war in Iraq had "hurt America's image, largely deservedly." The BBC's internet video of the show, here, gave me an error message saying it's not available in China. (I saw it on actual TV.) If it works where you are and you'd like to see someone stand his ground, check it out.
UPDATE: Word from the US is that this clip is available only in the UK. Sorry! But surely it's preposterous to suggest that the BBC can indefinitely bottle up its shows. Will pass on any word I get about other sources.
BETTER UPDATE: Gavin Sheridan points out that while the BBC's own iPlayer is UK-only, a number of shows, including the one I'm talking about, are available on its normal web site. So here it is, Mars, Venus, HARDtalk, and all.
June 1, 2008
Charlie Moskos
I was surprised and saddened to get an email message a few hours ago saying that Charles Moskos had just died, at 74.
The email from his wife of 41 years, Ilca, began: "Charles C. Moskos, of Santa Monica, Calif, formerly of Evanston, Ill, draftee of U.S. Army, died peacefully in his sleep after a valiant struggle with cancer." That sentence is a kind poetry, evoking whole aspects of his life in a few words.
"Formerly of Evanston" recalls his four decades as a popular and dedicated professor at Northwestern. See this article from the campus paper when a diagnosis of prostate cancer forced him to drop his classes two years ago.
"Draftee of U.S. Army" alludes to the great passion of Moskos's intellectual and public life: restoring the bond between the armed forces and the general public that was the best side effect of the conscript military into which he was drafted after graduating from Princeton in 1956. Elvis Presley was drafted into the Army the following year -- that was a sign of how broadly the armed forces drew from society through the Fifties and early Sixties. Moskos was tireless in conducting studies and devising policies about improving the civic-military bond. His efforts included two articles in the Atlantic, in 1986 and 1990.
That he died "peacefully" is a relief; that he struggled "valiantly" is consistent with everything else about his life. He had a very generous spirit and was always ready to laugh at himself. The one subject, in my experience, that he considered No Laughing Matter was the excellence of Greek-Americans, as compared with any other subset of humanity. As Ilca Hohn Moskos said in her message, "He was an academic, but not pretentious, funny, but not silly." A very good man.
May 28, 2008
I suppose outlawing the word "Homeland" wouldn't count?
Via Lewis Shepherd, news of a $25,000 competition to come up with the best idea to improve "Homeland Security." The competition is run by the Christopher Columbus Fellowship Foundation and apparently funded by AgustaWestland, a subsidiary of the Italian-based defense contractor Finmeccanica. Deadline for entries is this Friday afternoon.
Anyone can have, free, my entry in the contest: dumping the hideous, un-American, Orwellian, Teutonic-in-the-bad-sense term "Homeland" and renaming both the department and the entire concept "domestic" security.
May 25, 2008
Credit to the pioneers (updated twice)
All journalism involves simplification and compression. Otherwise a story could never end and would always be longer than the event it describes, to take all perspectives into account. Even our chronicles in the Atlantic involve serious last-minute cutting -- believe it or not!
Thus Fareed Zakaria's latest column in Newsweek, which as usual I agree with, has to leave out certain details to get to the main point. The main point: that there is such a thing as exaggerated fear of terrorism, and that U.S. politics shows ample and self-destructive illustrations of it.
Certain details necessarily left out of this column but that should remain on the record: the pioneering role of scholars like John Mueller (of Ohio State), Benjamin H. Friedman (of MIT -- not the economist Benjamin M. Friedman of Harvard), Ian Lustick (of Penn), Veronique de Rugy (now of George Mason U's Mercatus Center), and others in arguing from the start that the United States needed to be careful about doing too much, too cumbersomely, in its attempt to "protect" itself against every risk. My chronicle of their activities and arguments was in a 2006 Atlantic cover story, "Declaring Victory."
This was not so safe or comfortable an argument to make back, say, in 2004 when Benjamin Friedman began doing so. Such efforts are worth remembering.
Update: The security expert Bruce Schneier also deserves a place on the list of "sane when everyone else was going berserk" honorees. For instance, the issue of his "Crypto-Gram" newsletter that came out immediately after the 9/11 attacks said this:
Airline security measures are primarily designed to give the appearance of good security rather than the actuality. This makes sense, once you realize that the airlines' goal isn't so much to make the planes hard to hijack, as to make the passengers willing to fly. Of course airlines would prefer it if all their flights were perfectly safe, but actual hijackings and bombings are rare events and they know it.
This is not to say that all airport security is useless, and that we'd be better off doing nothing. All security measures have benefits, and all have costs: money, inconvenience, etc. I would like to see some rational analysis of the costs and benefits, so we can get the most security for the resources we have.
Some of Schneier's more recent thoughts here. Thanks to Jay Ackroyd for this reminder.
Update #2: Fareed Zakaria himself was also writing some "let's get a grip here" articles fairly early on, for instance this in 2004. (This previous post concerns a similar earlier battle.) And, this front page story in Monday's New York Times illustrates how far in the brainless auto-pilot direction Homeland "Security" policy has gone. It's much as foreseen in pop fiction.
April 25, 2008
Looking on the bright side #1: SECDEF Gates
Issues have come and gone over this last month, and they'll have to enter history without my imprimatur. But I will try in the next while to work back through a few of them, using the "if you can't say something nice..." standard*. I intend to mention a few technological, political, and other developments that deserve more attention or praise than they seem to have received.
As a start: the two speeches early this week by the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, about what he thinks is wrong with the culture of the professional military.
Gates starts out miles ahead simply by not being the man he replaced at the Pentagon, the odious Donald Rumsfeld. And even though Gates has implemented essentially the same Administration policy and administered the same gigantic budget that Rumsfeld left him, he has defended and explained his policies in ways suggesting that he has noticed, thought about, and attempted to address opposing views. This is in contrast to the haughty sneering-away of opposition so familiar from the Rumsfeld days.
In back-to-back speeches this Monday to the Air Force leadership at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama and then to the Army leadership at West Point, Gates revived what had always been the best part of Rumsfeld's approach in the Pentagon. This was a willingness to challenge the cautious, yes-man aspects of today's professional military culture. Rumsfeld gave all such questioning a bad name by his contemptuous disregard for professional military judgment in the runup to the Iraq war. But Gates still had a point -- and he made it in a surprising way.
Mark Danner's new article assessing the Bush-era "War on Terror" is very much worth reading. (A sample after the jump.) It is one of a rapidly-increasing number of good essays, speeches, and policy proposals looking at how the U.S. went wrong after 9/11 -- and not just in Iraq -- and how the next administration can start correcting the long string of previous mistakes.
This discussion needs to become more widespread, intense, and practical. John McCain is a vastly more admirable person than George W. Bush, but his strategy for Iraq and national security in general is an extension of Bush-Cheney. If and when the Democratic party moves past its current fratricide, it needs to make a big push here, not just for election purposes but so it can do something in 2009 if given the chance.
As the discussion continues, I immodestly offer this link to "Declaring Victory," the Atlantic story I wrote a year and a half ago on ways out of the War on Terror trap. As we near the end of the intellectual paralysis and policy rigidity of the Bush-Cheney years, some of the ideas people described to me back then seem, at least to me, all the more relevant.
From reader Dan Hobby, a group of soldiers at the Summer Palace in Beijing last year. The soldiers are turning around to look at the little daughter (not visible in picture) accompanying Hobby's in-laws, who are wearing blue jeans and jackets and seen from the back. The girl, age four, had been adopted in China three years earlier. It's worth clicking on the photo to see the enlargement, which shows the expressions on the soldiers' faces.
Cultural notes: 1) Chinese-looking daughters with Western-looking parents are a common sight in a few parts of China. In many other parts, they attract universal stares -- and these soldiers could have been country people, who had not seen such a thing before. 2) The frequent encounters with very casual-looking representatives of the People's Liberation Army do not, again, settle any arguments about China's military ambitions, its "asymmetric war" abilities, etc etc etc. But they are frequent.
March 7, 2008
My new homeland security hero: Gov. Brian Schweitzer (MT)
Listen to this item from Friday evening's All Things Considered and realize, in amazement, how long it has been since we have heard a public figure talk plain common sense about the "theater of security" and 'fraidy-cat authoritarianism of TSA-era America.
The speaker is Brian Schweitzer, elected governor of Montana in 2004. (A Democrat.) Good for him.
Point for later discussion: Right now I'd say that the biggest single difference between life as an American in China in the 2000s, versus my family's life as Americans in Japan and Malaysia for four years in the 1980s, is internet streaming audio. It's still a big nuisance to see U.S. television broadcasts in anything like real time -- or at all, given that the slowness of the Chinese internet makes streaming video difficult. But to listen to the NPR morning and evening shows live, with time zones reversed -- Morning Edition live at our dinner time, All Things Considered in the morning -- that is an enormous difference in connected-ness. We had email even back in those old days! Not Skype, of course, which rivals streaming audio in importance (and obviously is a variant of the same technology.) For now, glad that this phenomenon brought me the Schweitzer interview.
More observations of the Chinese military
After the jump, excerpts from two email messages I received from Westerners who have recently lived in or visited China.
Obviously they would not say, nor would I, that the casual/ragtag aspect of Chinese soldiers as encountered in normal urban life is representative of the whole Chinese military, indicates that China does not have advanced weapons or a growing navy, puts to rest all questions about China's ambitions, or so on. But this anecdotal exposure has an effect -- it's pretty much the opposite of the impression one gets from brief exposure to the US military -- and I bet that most foreign residents of China would say that these reports ring true. Certainly they do to me.
The same people -- same individuals, same organizations, same publications, same blog sites - that ginned up a war with Iraq, and that have supported ginning up a war with Iran, are settling in for a longer term confrontation with China.
These people need to be judged on their track record. And compared with a confrontation with Iraq or Iran, a military showdown with China would be 10 times as unnecessary and 100 times as stupid.
March 4, 2008
Jeez louise department (China and right-wing bloggers)
Late last night China time, joining in via Skype on an institution I had not been aware of before: a "Bloggers Roundtable" phone call from the Pentagon, discussing the newly released report on Chinese military power. I don't know who else is on the phone call, except for two officials who were supposed to be identified as "a Defense official." OK.
About the report, nothing to say until I have looked at it more closely. About other questions from other people, not my place to characterize them -- tempting as it is to give verbatim the tendentious line of argument / "questioning" from one right wing blogger in particular. But since this same guy (whose boss I have repeatedlymocked) has made it his business to mischaracterize what I said, let me take the unwise step of trying to set a blog record straight.
Nagl, Russert, and crises of institutional culture
Two very important articles:
1) Tom Ricks's story in the Washington Post revealing that Lt.Col John Nagl is leaving the Army to join a new DC think tank.
I am partial to Nagl, whom I know somewhat and like very much, and whom I interviewed, along with Lewis Sorley and Conrad Crane, two years ago on the Charlie Rose show. Indeed many reporters know and like him, and he has been a kind of media darling: subject of a (very good) cover-story profile by Peter Maass in the New York Times Magazine four years ago; author of a well-received book about the timeliest of military topics, counter-insurgency strategy; and one of the driving forces behind the new Army/Marine Corps "Counterinsurgency Field Manual," the same document whose existence is so often cited as one of general David Petraeus's great accomplishments. (Petraeus and Marine Corps general James Mattis sponsored the overall effort.) Nagl had been a Rhodes scholar and, like Petraeus (Princeton PhD) before him, has been a very prominent example of the media-savvy scholar-warrior.
This hasn't happened in a while, but after taking a few hours to to think it over, I've changed my mind and regret something I posted very recently. This is the glory and the curse of real-time reactions via the internet. The curse is saying something in "public" I would have simply eliminated as an early draft in "real" writing. The corrective (rather than glory) is being able to say quickly: I didn't quite mean that, "that" being this post about Jim Glassman as a successor to Karen Hughes as leader of America's "public diplomacy" efforts.
In four years of reporting on Iraq-war policy and anti-terrorism efforts in general, followed now by a year and a half of living overseas, I have grown increasingly exasperated about the way America's story has been mishandled and debased by those in charge of telling it. The idea of America, in its authentic version, should be attractive and inspiring to people around the world. No, this doesn't mean they will all want to be Americans. It does mean that they can respect us for what we're trying to do. The Atlantic just devoted a whole issue to this very topic.
If the world doesn't feel that way right now, it's largely though not entirely our own fault. Partly it's because of choices we've made. For instance: the process of getting into America legally, as a graduate student or a tourist, has become so insulting and off-putting that fewer people bother to try. But partly the U.S. has suffered because of the way it has tried -- really, hasn't tried -- to understand and address world concerns.
I'm still exasperated at the damage done to my country's reputation and name, and I have very low expectations of what Karen Hughes's successor, whoever it might be, will be able to accomplish. That person will have barely a year to operate; Guantanamo will still be running; there will still be a large U.S. troop presence in Iraq; the current president and vice president will still be in office. But it is possible that the verve, energy, and ingenuity Jim Glassman has shown through his career could be just the traits the person in that situation needs. As I think about him more, and more about the sources of my exasperation, I say: let's see what he can do in this next year.
But I still shouldn't coach the Redskins.
December 11, 2007
James K. Glassman: face of America
Update: pls see this next post for "on further reflection" thoughts on the topic.
I have known and liked Jim Glassman for a very, very long time, since we were both on the college newspaper together. We've each been through a variety of incarnations since then. One of his was as publisher of the Atlantic for two years in the 1980s. The Atlantic was also the magazine that ran an excerpt from his (and Kevin Hassett's) notorious well-known book Dow 36,000 as a cover story in 1999. He is a lively, funny, and creative guy, and there are lots of jobs for which I would happily sign him up.
But as the head of America's public-diplomacy efforts? What's the right analogy here... Maybe, the Redskins, finally concluding that Joe Gibbs was great in his time but that time has passed, bringing me in as head coach? Or suiting me up as left tackle to strengthen their battered O-line? I myself am a wonderful guy, and I'm interested in football, but...
Karen Hughes was a preposterous, tin-eared choice to begin with, reflecting the narcissistic view that to explain America to the world what you needed was somebody who understood George W. Bush really well, rather than somebody who understood the first thing about the outside world. On all available evidence, she only made worse what people don't like about America at the moment, which can be summarized (and oversimplified) as:
- in much of Asia, the idea that we're living off their hard work and cheap products, meanwhile blaming and lecturing them plus being too lazy to learn very much about them;
- in Europe, that we're too boorish and boosterish -- and, while those two traits have long been part of the European snootiness toward America, it's worse now because of the perceived loss of America's moral standing via Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, waterboarding, et al, plus the sense that Americans are fraidy-cats who will accept just about anything in the name of anti-terrorism;
- in much of the Arab-Islamic world... well, you know this already.
As I've argued in the Atlantic recently, America's idea is still powerful and attractive, and America still has the opportunity to present a compelling and authentic face to the world. Over the years I have met, through reporting, many true-blue patriotic Americans who have spent their careers learning how Asian (or European or Arab-Islamic etc) cultures work and think, and how America could best engage them. Jim Glassman, despite being a great guy, is not one of these. As with Hughes, this seems another choice driven by internal comfort (the assumption that he'd face no confirmation problems) rather than external suitability (demonstrated understanding of the outside world), which means another bad choice.
Unless, of course, things are far enough gone, in terms of this Administration's effect on America's image, and there's so little time left, that who's in the job doesn't matter anyway. In which case I will be sorry to have said anything. *
* (Last three sentences altered since first posting, to make internal/external point.)
December 4, 2007
Three simple points about Iran/NIE
These don't qualify as news, given no doubt voluminous discussion overnight (my time) in the U.S. Still, for my own personal record:
1) The report is unambiguously good news, of the sort we're not accustomed to receiving in recent years from that part of the world. At least it's good on the merits -- more on the politics below.
The Iran-hawks who have said that an Iranian nuke would threaten the very survival of the West should be relieved to hear that the threat is not at hand. The Iran-doves who have claimed that Iran could be turned away from the nuke path through diplomacy, delay, incentive, threat, etc should be grateful for evidence that something other than a U.S. military strike changed the Iranian leadership's mind. If an Iranian weapon would have been bad for America, for Israel, for Europe, and in the deepest sense for the Iranian people themselves, then all of those parties are now better off.
2) For nearly three years, "yes, they will" / "no, they wouldn't dare" arguments about the Bush Administration's intentionshave raged within the press and among analysts. The question was whether the president and vice president might actually go ahead and order a preemptive air or land strike against Iran -- despite the absence of clear Congressional approval, despite the obvious lack of support within America's professional military, despite the overwhelming evidence that in the crudest sense a military approach could not work. I've been in the "they wouldn't dare" camp -- and have urged members of Congress to remove doubt by prohibiting use of funds toward this end. Other writers and analysts have consistently said: No, just you wait, it's coming, these guys are determined to get the job done.
Not so thankful for this at Thanksgiving (Japan Big Brother dept)
Flying from Beijing to Tokyo this morning -- generally an invigorating experience! Japan looks startlingly neat and organized even if you're arriving from Switzerland. And when you're coming not from Switzerland but from China.... Anyhow I arrived excited at the prospect of a few days here.
Unfortunately Japan's way of ushering in the Thanksgiving holidays has been to institute mandatory fingerprinting and photographing of all foreigners entering the country. Let me put this bluntly: this is an incredibly degrading, offputting, and hostility-generating process. The comment is not anti-Japanese: when the U.S. does this to foreigners, it's wrong and degrading too (as many people, including me, have pointed out over the years). But Japan has just ushered in this procedure, and they deserve to take some heat for it.
1) From the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, the paper "Dereliction of Duty Redux?" by Frank Hoffman, a retired Marine officer and long-time military scholar, whom I know.
The paper's title refers, of course, to Col. H.R. McMaster's book from the 1990s Dereliction of Duty, which argued that the uniformed military leadership in the Vietnam era finally betrayed the military and the country by not more forcefully opposing policies in Vietnam it knew to be doomed. The book was extremely influential within today's officer corps -- and since McMaster himself, a youngish West Point grad when he wrote it, has been centrally involved in combat operations in Iraq (and now is part of Gen. David Petraeus's team), it has become a cliched joke that soon there will be "McMaster's McMaster" -- that is, some young officer who describes how even the person who saw what happened to the military in Vietnam was caught by a repetition of many of the same patterns.
Frank Hoffmann's essay goes into the similarities and differences in the military leadership's performance in Vietnam and Iraq -- and in particular the warring "narratives" inside the military about who will take the blame for what has gone wrong this time:
The nation’s leadership, civilian and military, need to come to grips with the emerging “stab in the back” thesis in the armed services and better define the social compact and code of conduct that governs the overall relationship between the masters of policy and the dedicated servants we ask to carry it out. Our collective failure to address the torn fabric and weave a stronger and more enduring relationship will only allow a sore to fester and ultimately undermine the nation’s security.
The essay is not not long and very much worth reading in its entirety.
2) A paper last week from the Pew Research Center* giving data to back up the general impression that Americans are thinking and talking less about the Iraq war than they did even a few months ago, and that the American media are paying less attention to the war. There's evidence in the paper for both sides of the chicken-and-egg question: less coverage because people don't care, or people don't care because of less coverage. Either way, here is the result:
Veterans' Day (and, my interview with Donald Rumsfeld...)
...back in 1993.
By my local China time it is now the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. This is November 11, which means variously, Remembrance Day, Armistice Day, or Poppy Day among countries on the Allied side of World War I, and of course Veterans' Day in the United States.
Originally this was a moment for looking backwards, to honor those who had served in the Great War and mourn those who had died. Its retrospective purpose remains. But for Americans right now it should also be a moment to honor the men and women who continue to serve and sacrifice and be injured and die -- and to reflect on the fact that, for the first time in our modern history, they do so with absolutely no shared sacrifice or service from the public at large. Everyone knows this and avoids thinking much about it. Today it's worth at least remembering.
Also it is worth looking at several articles the Atlantic has brought up from the archives and made available free, for now. They're about Vietnam, not Iraq or Afghanistan (or Iran), but several are significant in their own right in addition to shedding indirect light on our current and continuing wars. Let me emphasize two:
This is not my usual beat nor my usual way of operating, but: on this visit to the U.S. I feel obliged to note, in solidarity with Andrew Sullivan and Matthew Yglesias of the Atlantic (among others), that I hope senators will vote No on the nomination of Michael Mukasey as attorney general.
Here's the reason: The Administration has proven that it cannot be given the benefit of the doubt on questions of civil liberties, expansion of executive powers, or the conversion of its open-ended, ill-defined, decades-long state of "war" into an excuse for permanent, abusive, often secret changes in the balance of rights and powers that is America's greatest constitutional achievement.
On crucial points, Mukasey's second-day testimony amounted to a request that he and the Administration be trusted to do the right thing. Nothing against him personally, but the time for trust has passed. Unless Mukasey explicitly repudiates the most abusive parts of his predecessor's (and his President's) record, the Senate would be negligent and reckless to approve him.
A specific point: the "waterboarding" outrage. As is now becoming famous, Mukasey said this, when asked by Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse whether waterboarding was constitutional:
“I don’t know what is involved in the technique,” Mr. Mukasey replied. “If waterboarding is torture, torture is not constitutional.”
Either way you slice it, this answer alone is grounds for rejecting Mukasey. If he really doesn't "know what is involved" in the technique, he is unacceptably lazy or ill-informed. Any citizen can learn about this technique with a few minutes on the computer.* Any nominee for Attorney General in 2007 who has not taken the time to inform himself fits the pattern of ignorant incuriosity we can no longer afford at the highest levels.
Before leaving China, I hadn't heard about the House of Representatives' vote on a resolution condemning Turkey for the Armenian genocide of the World War I era.
Now that I've heard about it, I find that it leads naturally to this question:
Is America insane??????
To be more precise: have the Congressional Democratic leaders lost their minds in not finding a way to bottle up this destructive and self-righteously posturing measure?
Maybe they think that the U.S. has so many friends in the Islamic world, especially in countries bordering Iraq, that it should go out of its way to make new enemies?
Or -- and this is truly appalling possibility -- perhaps they think that America’s moral standing is so high at the moment that we will be admired and thanked worldwide for delivering condemnations of sins committed in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire?
Update: people who are glad they went to work for GW Bush
As mentioned yesterday, it's hard to think of people whose reputations have been burnished through service in the GW Bush Administration. Making the opposite list is easy: Eight years ago, Dick Cheney's reputation was as a level-headed foreign policy pro. Same for Donald Rumsfeld. Alberto Gonzales was a rising talent. Scooter Libby, a cosmopolitan lawyer. Paul Bremer, a successful diplomat....
Several people have written me with suggestions, almost all of them people who look better than those around them because they said, Watch out, things are going to hell! Richard Clarke; Lawrence Lindsey; Eric Shinseki; the Abu Ghraib investigator Antonio Taguba, etc. A less obvious but worthy suggestion would be Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill, principal authors of the Army War College's prescient, and of course overlooked, pre-war handbook on how to run a successful occupation. (The study's history recounted here; subscribers only.) James Baker and Lee Hamilton of the Iraq Study Group?
A very interesting discussion is going on in the comments section of Ezra Klein's blog, here. The interesting part is the way you have to bend definitions to argue that the Administration has made certain people look "better." Eg, John Ashcroft: a better reputation as Attorney General than in his previous political career? Maybe not. A better reputation than what came after him, especially for his apparent sickbed opposition to a surveillance scheme? Maybe so.
But people who will be honored for an unambiguously positive contribution through these years? So far it's a challenging search. We have a John Yoo with his Yoo Theories on torture, but no George Marshall with his Marshall Plan. Any positive suggestions welcomed.
Additional discussion here by Brian Beutler, and some interesting possibilities from Moira Whelan.
September 11, 2007
Update/correction on previous CNN item
For oddball tech reasons, I am unable to update the previous CNN item without breaking all existing links to it. So I'll add the new info this way.
The original item said:
* Michael Ware, usually a very, very tough critic of U.S. policy, narrates a perilous drive through Baghdad and refers maybe 50 times to "al Qaeda" threatening to attack him or Iraqi civilians.
Actually Ware's drive was deep into al Anbar. (Anderson Cooper was narrating the drive to the Baghdad airport -- I'm pretty sure.) Sorry for that misrecollection. The real point concerned Ware's repeated references -- and Cooper's, and those of everyone else during the hour or so of CNN coverage I saw -- to "al Qaeda" (along with Iran) as the adversary in Iraq.
Not "al Qaeda in Iraq," as President Bush himself is typically careful to say. Not "AQI," as the U.S. military typically puts it on its charts and PowerPoints. From CNN it was plain old "al Qaeda."
To U.S. viewers, plain old "al Qaeda" is the organization that attacked America six years ago. I don't see CNN consistently enough to be sure when they began applying this term to fighters within Iraq -- or whether it's a phenomenon of more than this one show. But on the basis of its unvarying use by a number of correspondents on this one show, I would have to assume that the change in terminology reflects a shift in "house style," as we in the media biz call it. Michael Ware himself, whom I don't know but do admire, has been the very opposite of a patsy for the Administration in his reporting from Iraq.
So why the change in CNN labeling? It's a mystery to me.
September 8, 2007
On the problem of rogue states
Within the last two two weeks, Chinese military hackers reportedly tried to break into secure servers run by the German and U.S. governments. German and U.S. officials have reportedly both complained – for reasons spelled out in this story by David Lague: How can they trust Chinese leaders' assurances of non-threatening intent if they can't be sure the People's Liberation Army sees things the same way? The PLA's successful test of an anti-satellite weapon early this year awakened the same fears.
Yes, having some degree of certainty, of reasonable boundaries, about what a nation might and might not do is an important element of international stability. With that point in mind, think of this: No one on earth can be sure that the U.S. government will not launch an aerial strike or a land invasion of Iran in the next 16 months.
... you know that it's moved beyond the realm of Policy Expert Debate.
Here's the Policy Expert version of a certain concept:
Talking about the "global war on terror" and the constant focus on threat Americans face from terrorism has been an unwise strategy. It has magnified any terrorists' influence, by helping them do their work of scaring the public; it has unified rather than divided potential adversaries; it has made it hard to think carefully about where and how the public can most effectively defend itself. At best it has not helped, and at worst it has impeded, the case-by-case surveillance and police effort through which British and now, apparently, Danish and German authorities have thwarted possible plots. (Recall that British officials went out of their way to avoid the term "global war on terror" when talking about their successes in penetrating potential terrorist groups.)
Here is the pop-fiction version of the same concept:
1) Daniel Silva, A Death in Vienna: As in many of Silva's books, the plot turns on the discovery of an elderly Nazi war criminal nestled in comfortable respectability in today's Western Europe. I am spoiling no surprises by saying that in this book, a crack Israeli team nabs the latest aged, hidden malefactor in Austria and is trying to smuggle him out of the country by car. Their nemesis, a (Nazi-sympathizer-at-heart) Austrian police official named Kruz, wonders how to stop them. Suddenly a brilliant idea pops into his mind:
My colleague Matthew Yglesias quotes the latest (very good) Newsweek article detailing how the war in Iraq undercut the original "war on terror."
By the beginning of 2002 -- when Osama bin Laden was still on the run after his narrow escape at Tora Bora, when the United States still enjoyed vast, strong international support in its effort to evict the Taliban and stabilize Afghanistan, when no member of the Bush Administration had publicly discussed the prospect of invading Iraq -- preparations to invade Iraq were already underway. They gutted the effort in Afghanistan.
It is easy to prove now, and was easy to figure out at the time, that the more the United States concentrated on Saddam Hussein, the less it could concentrate on Osama bin Laden. This was one of many reasons to oppose the war before it began: not just the direct costs it would bring inside Iraq but what we could bloodlessly call its opportunity costs elsewhere.
The story of this tradeoff is an old one. It has been told many places, including in a cover story I did for the Atlantic three years ago. (Subscribers only; subscribe!) Even then, when Iraq was less obviously a disaster, people let me put them on the record saying things like this:
"Had we seen Afghanistan as anything other than a sideshow," says Larry Goodson, a scholar at the Army War College who spent much of 2002 in Afghanistan, "we could have stepped up both the economic and security presence much more quickly than we did. Had Iraq not been what we were ginning up for in 2002, when the security situation in Afghanistan was collapsing, we might have come much more quickly to the peacekeeping and 'nation-building' strategy we're beginning to employ now."...
Steve Riley is a security expert at Microsoft; John Mueller holds the Woody Hayes Chair in National Security Studies at Ohio State.
I know and like John Mueller (who is also a leading expert on Fred Astaire), and in my Atlantic article "Declaring Victory" one year ago I talked about his argument that America's over-reaction to the threat of future terrorist attack had damaged it more deeply than attacks themselves were ever likely to. He laid out this theory at length in his book Overblown.
I don't know Riley but was intrigued by this report, on the Australian tech website APCMAG, of his saying that the unthinking attempt to remove all possible security threats often destroys the efficiency, value, and integrity of the thing you are trying to "protect." What's intriguing is that Riley, unlike many tech officials, drew the explicit comparison: too many security features can make software unusable, and too much security can make free societies unrecognizable. (Or just hopelessly inefficient, as with the recent impossible legislative requirement that every single shipping container entering the United States be scanned before it leaves a foreign port.)
This leaves only two questions: Did the report accurately reflect Riley's views? I emailed him via his site to ask. And if so, why did he let his company include in Windows Vista something called "User Account Control," which exemplifies the overkill approach to security that he so astutely warns about?
Actually, there's one more question: Who will be the first historian to say of America in the years after 9/11: they had to destroy the country in order to save it?
July 23, 2007
Sane thinking about airborne threats (updated)
The pattern is too strong to be ignored: traditional conservatives (Heritage) and libertarians (Cato) have done a better job of of thinking about how a free society can defend itself without giving up its freedom than the Democratic or Republican establishment has. Unlike Democrats, they're not so worried about looking "weak" that they have to posture about every conceivable threat. Unlike the Administration -- well, they're sane.
Two well-known examples: Cato, for sponsoring the work of John Mueller, of Ohio State. (His influential 2004 essay, "A False Sense of Insecurity," is here in a large PDF file.) And, oddly enough, AEI, which apparently harbors an actual conservative among its neo-cons and "surge" enthusiasts. This is Veronique de Rugy, who has looked very critically at the homeland-security- industrial complex. I won't even get into Ron Paul....
A recent entry in the honor roll: James Jay Carafano, a West Point graduate who works at Heritage. His new essay, concerning the potential terrorist threat from small airplanes, is the first I've seen that both acknowledges there is some threat and proposes reasonable, proportionate steps to deal with it. Perhaps I'm biased because Carafano calls for elimination of the stupidest "homeland security" measure of all: the creation of a Potemkin air-defense zone called ADIZ, covering thousands of square miles around Washington. Even beyond my bias, this is a very good analysis.
Update: Ah, now this makes more sense. Veronique de Rugy is no longer at AEI but instead at a non-neocon, "classical liberal" plus libertarian stronghold, George Mason University's Mercatus Center. Phew!
July 20, 2007
The two Benjamin Friedmans of Cambridge, Mass.
It's important to keep your Benjamin Friedmans straight.
Benjamin M. Friedman, who must be in his early 60s, is an eminent professor of economics at Harvard and a frequent contributor to the New York Review of Books and, yes, the Atlantic. He has helped lead us to clear thinking about economics and related political/cultural matters.
Benjamin H. Friedman, who must be in his late 20s, is a PhD candidate at MIT who has done some very valuable work at a tender age. An essay three years ago in MIT's publication "Breakthroughs" was one of the earliest attempts, anywhere, to say: wait a minute, how much are we willing to give away or throw away in the name of being "safe"? (The essay is "Leap before you look" and is on page 29 of this 6MB PDF file.) The logic is now familiar: just as a person can avoid many "risks" by never leaving the house or answering the phone, so a society can be "secure" by keeping everyone under scrutiny all the time. The only problem is, what makes life worth living disappears. Again, many people say this now: fewer did in 2004.
As far as I know, the two Benjamins are not related.
Benjamin "MIT" Friedman has recently pointed out another "leap before you look" step in the quest for security:the impending Congressional mandate, reported here by our sister publication Government Executive, to require the government to scan all cargo containers before they are shipped to the United States.
The more I think about it, the more I marvel (as in previous item) at Sec. Chertoff's "gut feeling" comment. It's very much in the spirit of the wonderful "Demotivational" posters offered by Despair.com:
Think if Sec. Chertoff had been on hand at other big moments in history:
Audio here from my interview yesterday (from Shanghai) with Liane Hansen of NPR, looking back on my Sept 2006 Atlantic article arguing that the best way to hold down the threat and consequences of terrorism was to declare the "War on Terrorism" over. (Original article here; related Atlantic material here and here.) The question arose, of course, in light of Michael Chertoff's "gut feeling" that another strike might be imminent.
I didn't think to put it this bluntly over the radio, but Sec. Chertoff's comment ran about as contrary to all prevailing thought on dealing with terrorism (except, perhaps, the thoughts of GW Bush and RB Cheney) as is possible to do.
It is hard to know what is the most contemptible part of President Bush's press conference (ongoing as I write -- and as I listen to it, on a Cspan internet feed, in Shanghai). But it's going to be hard to top what he just uttered: the most blatant attempt so far to blame everything that went wrong in Iraq on the advice of the military.
Don't have the transcript in front of me now, but the point was: Hey, I asked Tommy Franks if he was ready to go -- including the postwar phase; and he said Sure, no problem. So (says the President), Don't blame me! I was listening to the experts!
Yes, as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz so notably listened to Gen. Eric Shinseki. And yes, the president's laser-like assessment of Gen. Franks' shortcomings must have lain behind his decision to give him the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Talk about "personal accountability" and "supporting the troops." (Franks does deserve a good share of the blame, and so do other military commanders -- but not for reasons the President apparently even grasps.)
Close second in the most-contemptible derby, half way through the press conference: Catechism-like repetition of the idea that we have to "fight them in Iraq so we don't fight them here." I wonder if anyone has ever dared challenge the logic of this to the President's face. (Ie, what are you talking about??? Why should people bother to plant bombs in Baghdad if they thought they had a chance of planting them in DC?) My oh my.
July 10, 2007
More on Gary Hart, Lynne Cheney, and war with China
Several days ago I recounted a story Gary Hart had told about Lynne Cheney, who was chomping at the bit to confront China militarily early in 2001 -- before her husband and his president had their attention directed elsewhere later that year. As Hart said in concluding the story, "I am convinced that if it had not been for 9/11, we would be in a military showdown with China today."
Various voices in blog-world have complained that there's nothing new here: Of course the neo-cons were raring for a confrontation with China. And of course that is true. Anyone who was paying attention to defense debates knew that during the "monopower" era of the late 1990s, when the familiar old Soviet enemy had gone away and the new enemy of Islamic extremism had not clearly announced itself, the long-term Chinese threat was what military thinkers were thinking about. The notoriety of a translated Chinese military text, known in English as Unrestricted War: China's Master Plan to Destroy America, is a subtle little clue that some people have been working this theme for a long time.
The point of the Lynne Cheney story is not that it confounded all previous understanding. It is that it confirmed what we already suspected. It would be like finding a recording of a conversation between Paul Wolfowitz and his mentor Donald Rumsfeld in the late 1990s, saying something like: You know, if we ever have the chance, we have to do whatever it takes to get rid of that damned Saddam. The details would be important even if the main theme was less than a dumbfounding surprise.
After Gary Hart told me about Lynne Cheney's petulance, I asked him: has this ever been publicized? He said, No (but he had no objection to people knowing about it now). That is the point of the story: new and interesting details in a tragedy whose central plot line we already know.
July 5, 2007
Gary Hart, Lynne Cheney, and War with China
I mentioned this yesterday in the (somewhat-insiderish) realm of the Atlantic's "Aspen Ideas Festival" blog, but the point seemed worth repeating in this marginally more public venue. The item appears after the jump, or at this link. It concerns the war that some public officials tried to prevent, and the war that at least one official tried to foment:
I liked the book but was in no hurry to see the movie version of David Guterson’s Snow Falling on Cedars. As Pacific Northwest atmospherics it was great; as a mystery it was very good; as a story of star-crossed love it was not that interesting to me; and as a reminder of the racial injustices against Japanese-Americans in World War II it was worthy but I thought already got the point.
Now I realize: that was pre-9/11 thinking. (The movie came out in 1999.)
This is what I am denied, or spared, by being trapped in Chinese factories or hospitals and getting only intermittent glimpses of real-time Campaign 2008 rhetoric:
Rudy Giuliani’s answer to the first substantive question of the debate. Knowing everything we know now, good idea or bad idea to have invaded Iraq?
Absolutely the right thing to do. It’s unthinkable that you would leave Saddam Hussein in charge of Iraq and be able to fight the war on terror. And the problem is that we see Iraq in a vacuum. Iraq should not be seen in a vacuum. Iraq is part of the overall terrorist war against the United States.
Last fall, in an Atlantic cover story called “Declaring Victory,” I discussed the one big advantage the United States held over most European countries when it came to dealing with Islamic terrorists: the loyalty and assimilation of America’s Muslim and Arabic-origin populations. The two categories are not identical — many U.S. Muslims are from Pakistan, India, Iran, or other non-Arab countries; many Arab-Americans are non-Islamic, especially Lebanese Christians — but they are similar in overall success in America and resistance to extremist views. For instance (from that article):
“The patriotism of the American Muslim community has been grossly underreported,” says Marc Sageman, who has studied the process by which people decide to join or leave terrorist networks. According to Daniel Benjamin, a former official on the National Security Council and coauthor of The Next Attack, Muslims in America “have been our first line of defense.” Even though many have been “unnerved by a law-enforcement approach that might have been inevitable but was still disturbing,” the community has been “pretty much immune to the jihadist virus.”
It has been obvious for quite a while that calling the effort to contain violent extremists a "global war on terror" does nothing to help the cause, and hurts in many ways. It unifies opponents who might otherwise have little in common. It gives them what they want, in elevating them to parity with the world's great powers. To the extent the U.S. or U.K. public pays attention to it, it further helps the terrorist cause, by making people, well, terrorized. To the extent the public comes to ignore it, it cheapens the whole concept of war.
United Air Lines, San Francisco-Dulles, oversold plane, passengers fighting to avoid being bumped. My wife and I luckily end up with really nice seats. In keeping with our larger attitude these first few days back from China, we are actively grateful for every comfort.
While waiting for the flight we end up sitting in the area where all the flight attendants are congregating and chatting about their schedules. From this vantage point, 30 minutes before boarding time, we see two people who are obviously this flight's air marshals walk down the jetway toward the plane. To ensure the safety of the traveling public, I won't give further details, except to say:
Shanghai-San Francisco, UAL, 10 hours+ in the plane, the magic of business class! I am tall enough, and old enough, and have had enough experience with the 31" seat pitch in economy, to appreciate every minute in which my knees are not jammed into the seat ahead.
Bigger surprise: full set of metal cutlery with the meal, knife too!
The National Magazine Awards are a highly quirky part of journalistic culture, but magazines naturally embrace any good news they offer and scratch their heads at the nuttyness of it all when the results are disappointing -- I mean, "surprising." Meaning no disrespect to anyone, it was, umm, surprising last year when ESPN: The Magazine beat The New Yorker in the "General Excellence" category.
This year's crop of finalists was just announced, and the news the Atlantic will embrace is that we are in the finals in three categories, including my "Declaring Victory" article for the "Public Interest" award. The Atlantic'sweb site has, for now, made its nominated entries (and many past winners) freely available, not just for subscribers. My article, from September 2006, is here.
February 26, 2007
The surprising anti-war message of '24'
Jane Mayer's article about the casually pro-torture message of '24' has gotten a lot of attention, and with reason. It's a wonderful piece of journalism that makes an important point.
But here's a less obvious side of '24' -- or, perhaps, a generally-forgotten one, just because of the passage of years.
Am I being too rational? The prospect of war on Iran
Starting late in 2004, I have been writing that the United States could not rationally comtemplate attacking Iran. (For reasons laid out in 2004, 2006, and 2007.) Through that time I have been arguing with friends, adversaries, and people I do not know, all of whom keep saying: rational or not, it's coming!
A new record for stupidity in the "Global War on Terror"
All right, I am biased. The most egregious empty-symbolism measures to "protect" Americans often involve aviation -- because airplanes attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, because airplanes scare many people, and because the inconvenienced community of aviation enthusiasts is so small. Because tens of millions of people take commercial airline flights, some sanity eventually returns to TSA airline-screening rules. For example: allowing tiny tubes of toothpaste or hand cream back onto flights. The measures that affect small-plane travel tend to get stuck at their lunatic extreme, since so few people are exposed to them and see how nutty they actually are. When I was flying in the United States, I was one of that small number; that's why I'm biased.
I had thought that the rules for "defense" of Washington DC airspace against small planes set the standard in foolishness. But we have a new winner.
The post-9/11 "security" restrictions in airspace around Washington have always been pointless. Now they may actually have killed people -- or helped to, and the ones who perished were not terrorists.
Sir Richard Dearlove was the former head of British secret intelligence, and a central figure in the famed "Downing Street Memorandum," reporting eons before Bob Woodward that the intelligence had been "fixed" for the plan to invade Iraq. Here is a .WMV file of my interview with him and Shashi Tharoor at Aspen. It is notable especially for his argument about why the U.S. was destroying itself by cutting legal and ethical corners in the Global War on Terror -- as described at the time here.
October 20, 2006
How Gary Cooper can save us (from Mayor Daley, among others)
Here are the four ways we'll know that Americans are regaining their sanity about "Homeland Security"
1) When some politician has the guts to stop using the hideous term Homeland Security, or "Homeland" itself.