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More on Chinese lack of interest in Iran
A reader makes a point (following
this post) about why the Iranian drama seems so much less compelling from inside China than it does in much of the West. There is more, well, John Bull-esque swagger to this note than I'd probably have if making the point myself. But I basically agree with this perspective. It's not all government info-control and censorship.
"I think it's good to keep in mind that Chinese folks tend to have a certain antediluvian sense of detachment when it comes to foreign affairs, sort of almost pre-war British John Bull-esque isolationist vintage. They just don't care particularly about what happens in foreign countries. They really couldn't give a whistle if a foreign country is communist or democratic or whatever. They just want to be left alone to make their wages and buy their house and cars.
"And I think that detachment is probably much more powerful than any silly, heavy-handed government innuendo and propaganda, at the end of the day. Everyone paid more attention to Europe and America, that's true, but Europe and America are important and rich and to be emulated in their wealth; toward the developing world, the feeling is sort of a disinterested bemusement from the average man-in-the-street.
"So I think the best way to view the Iran coverage in China is, frankly, to ignore it. Government press might have (really stupid) agendas to pursue in relation to this, fighting the colour revolutions and so on, but the average man couldn't care less. And it's quite exactly the same thing when that clown Hugo Chavez is feted in the Chinese press; he's viewed more as a curiosity than as some glorious David, hero of the Developing World-cum-Israelites.
"And I personally think that, for China at least, this is not an unhealthy attitude. Splendid (Sino-)Isolation ought be cause for relief for the rest of the world.
"....Another thing I forgot, and this is I think how someone used to describe the pre-war British, is that the Chinese generally find foreigners funny. Not serious, not genuinely dangerous, not heroic and considerable (as an European might for MLK, or an American for Thatcher or both for Mandala), but nice and funny in a harmless sort of way."
Again, while the writer is deliberately heading into campy-Orientalism by the end of the note, and while a billion-person country has exceptions to any generalization (I know Chinese people who quite clearly are inspired by Martin Luther King, or Gandhi, or Isaac Newton, or John Dewey, or....) the basic point rings true to me. Including the "not unhealthy" part -- worth bearing in mind when you hear the next "China as master of the world" scare-lecture.
Iran in China
I have been out of China for a week and away from internet contact most of that time, including the last day-plus. So I am behind the curve on the Iranian drama in general, and the way it's playing in China in particular. But in response to a number of requests for tips on how to judge the reaction of China's officialdom, media (controlled by officialdom), and populace, here are some guidelines.
1) Never underestimate the ability of the Chinese media to steer attention toward -- or away from -- stories both domestic and foreign. Over the past six weeks, as H1N1/swine flu has been waning as a front-line concern in most countries, it has been end-of-days news inside China. And right now -- Monday evening, June 22, China time -- when Iran's fate is dominant news in much of the world, it's a second- or third-tier item in the official Chinese media. The current front page of People Daily (in Chinese,
here) has Iran as a fairly minor news item. English version of People's Daily Online,
here, currenty shows the same understated play.
2) It is worth remembering that the elements of the Iranian story that give it such drama and importance in much of the world are less automatically resonant in China.
One part of the narrative -- a massed populace standing up against state power -- is obviously anathema to Chinese authorities. And many of the other themes are also less immediate and compelling to ordinary people in China than they would be in North America, Europe, or parts of the Islamic world.
To most Westerners, everything about this story matters. It involves a people's struggle to make their voices heard; it follows other "color revolutions" in former Soviet territories and indeed popular movements for democracy and rule of law in Asia and Latin America from the 1980s onwards; it potentially marks a crucial moment in the evolution of modern Islamic society; it can have war-and-peace implications for US foreign policy and Israeli actions; and so on. Ordinary members of the Western viewing audience feel a connection to these themes. I assert that they seem more distant to ordinary people in China -- even if the themes were featured on the news. People's own problems, and their business problems, and the country's problems, are enough to worry about.
3) The Chinese publications that are explicitly aimed at foreign readers, the redoubtable China Daily and its new complement Global Times, have taken a predictable but still interesting line. Right now the
China Daily is, like the People's Daily, underplaying the story altogether. The new
Global Times, generally seen as taking an edgier and more adventurous approach to advancing telling China's "soft power" presentation of its official perspective worldwide, went with this as its lead item today:
The themes of "outside interference" and "victimization by Western powers" are comfortable, reflexive positions for the Chinese government's foreign policy establishment to take, so are the natural positions here.
4) I don't think anyone in the foreign media has any clear idea of what the Chinese leadership really is thinking about Iran and its implications.
5) I have lacked online time to follow up on the Chinese blog world but welcome submissions by readers, which I will share.
About the internet, the Atlantic, and Iran
In coverage of Iran over the past week and especially in these last few days, Andrew Sullivan has
on his site illustrated the way the internet and related technologies have permanently changed journalism for the better. So have a number of other people at other sites, which have made themselves clearinghouses for information coming out of Iran in emails, blog posts, camera-phone and ad hoc video transmissions, and other forms including, yes, Twitter feeds. Collectively they've let the outside world know more about what is happening in a would-be sealed-off country, and given people inside that country a place to share and compare news as they could not possibly have done even a few years ago.
This fact is worth noting its own right, as a moment when we see that something truly new and positive has occurred. It's also worth observing in light of the many seemingly-permanent changes for the worse in journalism that have coincided with the internet era, whether or not they've been caused by it.
If I'm not mentioning anything about Iran at the moment, it's not because I think the news unimportant but rather because I have no contacts in the country and nothing to add to the discussion. As we follow developments there it's worth recognizing the different era in communications that has begun.
Another view on nukes, bombs, and Iran
Earlier today
I cited yet another
study discussing the real-world folly of contemplating preemptive aerial attacks on Iran's nuclear-development sites, whether those attacks were carried out by the Israelis or the United States.
Quickly I heard from a long-time friend who was raised in Europe, has lived around the world, and is deeply familiar with and fond of American habits and life. He said he had grown exasperated with discussions of practicality and impracticality and thought there should be more emphasis on whether such an attack could be "right." After the jump, most of his argument, followed by my view on the "right and wrong" point. He begins:
I wonder: why does everybody continue missing the point about Iran, particularly in the US?
The fact that Iranians, as a whole, love Americans is beyond dispute: I verified it directly and through many conversations with foreign observers during my two immensely pleasant visits there (I suggest you should go too, actually, when you get a chance). [I have been there once, long ago.] This is partly because Americans are not Arabs (who brought an unwelcome creed there), nor Brits (seen as scheming and unreliable rats)...
Continue reading "Another view on nukes, bombs, and Iran" »
What if the Israelis bomb Iran?
Watching Barack Obama's address to the Iranian public from outside the United States, though obviously not from inside Iran, I don't share Andrew
Sullivan's concern that it will come off as patronizing. Instead I think it will seem, for those able to watch, startlingly and disarmingly respectful. After all, this is the
President of the United States, not denouncing or lecturing an "enemy" audience but addressing them in friendly and supportive terms. Therefore I think it is part of a shrewd long-term play for rapprochement with an Iranian public that by all reports is potentially far more pro-Western than its current zealot leadership. Of course the same people who disagreed with Obama in 2002 about the wisdom of invading Iraq are certain to denounce him now for being too soft.
But clearly this approach does not solve the short-term problem of curbing the Iranian leadership's nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, and for fuller discussion another time, no other approach immediately solves that problem either. For now it is worth considering
this extensive analysis from CSIS, by the indefatigable Anthony Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, of the ever-tempting "
Osirak" option: allowing / encouraging / condoning / watching Israeli warplanes as they attack nuclear facilities in Iran.
The report is more than 100 pages long and tries to assess the feasibility of an attack from every angle. (A 2006 assessment by Cordesman of all options for dealing with Iran is
here. The results of a 2004 Atlantic-sponsored "war game" involving Iran are
here.) In its examination of second- and third- order effects, it strongly reminds me of the reports I read and
wrote about in 2002, emphasizing that the conquest of Iraq was likely to be far more complex, costly, and likely to backfire than its boosters assumed. Many of the same boosters are again willing to assume away the practicalities in urging a military showdown with Iran.
After the jump, a few of the summary points. But you should look at the whole report.
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Continue reading "What if the Israelis bomb Iran?" »
Three simple points about Iran/NIE
These don't qualify as news, given no doubt voluminous discussion overnight (my time) in the U.S. Still, for my own personal record:
1) The report is unambiguously good news, of the sort we're not accustomed to receiving in recent years from that part of the world. At least it's good on the merits -- more on the politics below.
The Iran-hawks who have said that an Iranian nuke would threaten the very survival of the West should be relieved to hear that the threat is not at hand. The Iran-doves who have claimed that Iran could be turned away from the nuke path through diplomacy, delay, incentive, threat, etc should be grateful for evidence that something other than a U.S. military strike changed the Iranian leadership's mind. If an Iranian weapon would have been bad for America, for Israel, for Europe, and in the deepest sense for the Iranian people themselves, then all of those parties are now better off.
2) For nearly three years, "yes, they will" / "no, they wouldn't dare" arguments about the Bush Administration's intentions have raged within the press and among analysts. The question was whether the president and vice president might actually go ahead and order a preemptive air or land strike against Iran -- despite the absence of clear Congressional approval, despite the obvious lack of support within America's professional military, despite the overwhelming evidence that in the crudest sense a military approach could not work. I've been in the "they wouldn't dare" camp -- and have urged members of Congress to remove doubt by prohibiting use of funds toward this end. Other writers and analysts have consistently said: No, just you wait, it's coming, these guys are determined to get the job done.
Continue reading "Three simple points about Iran/NIE" »
Armenians, Cubans, and AIPAC
A way to think about the Walt-Mearsheimer book and related controversies:
- To the (large) extent that the Armenian-American lobby ginned up support for a pointless and destructive resolution condemning sins of the Ottoman Empire, it advanced its own causes at the expense of larger American interests. The people who did this are mainly from one ethnic group (Armenian-American) and of one religion (Christian, notably Armenian Apostolic or Armenian Orthodox).
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- To the (huge and obvious) extent that the Cuban-American lobby has muscled the United States into its small-minded and punitive embargo of Castro's Cuba these last 45 years, it has advanced its own causes at the expense of larger American interests. The people who have done this are mainly from one ethnic group (Cuban-American) and of one religion (Christian, notably Roman Catholic).
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- To the (ongoing) extent that AIPAC -- the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which calls itself "America's Pro-Israel Lobby" -- is trying to legitimize a military showdown between the United States and Iran, it is advancing its own causes at the expense of larger American interests. The people who are doing this are not from one ethnic group in the conventional sense but are mainly of one religion (Jewish).
To observe these patterns, and warn against them (including the disastrous consequences of attacking Iran), is not to be anti-Armenian, anti-Orthodox, anti-Cuban, anti-Catholic, or anti-Semitic. Nor is it to deny that members of each lobby claim, and probably believe, that what they're recommending is best for America too. But in these cases they're wrong. And noting these groups' power and potential to distort policy mainly means recognizing that James Madison's warnings about the invidious effects of "faction"* apply beyond the 18th century in which he wrote.
* Federalist 10: "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."
Update/correction on previous CNN item
For oddball tech reasons, I am unable to update the previous CNN item without breaking all existing links to it. So I'll add the new info this way.
The original item said:
* Michael Ware, usually a very, very tough critic of U.S. policy, narrates a perilous drive through Baghdad and refers maybe 50 times to "al Qaeda" threatening to attack him or Iraqi civilians.
Actually Ware's drive was deep into al Anbar. (Anderson Cooper was narrating the drive to the Baghdad airport -- I'm pretty sure.) Sorry for that misrecollection. The real point concerned Ware's repeated references -- and Cooper's, and those of everyone else during the hour or so of CNN coverage I saw -- to "al Qaeda" (along with Iran) as the adversary in Iraq.
Not "al Qaeda in Iraq," as President Bush himself is typically careful to say. Not "AQI," as the U.S. military typically puts it on its charts and PowerPoints. From CNN it was plain old "al Qaeda."
To U.S. viewers, plain old "al Qaeda" is the organization that attacked America six years ago. I don't see CNN consistently enough to be sure when they began applying this term to fighters within Iraq -- or whether it's a phenomenon of more than this one show. But on the basis of its unvarying use by a number of correspondents on this one show, I would have to assume that the change in terminology reflects a shift in "house style," as we in the media biz call it. Michael Ware himself, whom I don't know but do admire, has been the very opposite of a patsy for the Administration in his reporting from Iraq.
So why the change in CNN labeling? It's a mystery to me.
On the problem of rogue states
Within the last two two weeks, Chinese military hackers reportedly tried to break into secure servers run by the German and U.S. governments. German and U.S. officials have reportedly both complained – for reasons spelled out in this story by David Lague: How can they trust Chinese leaders' assurances of non-threatening intent if they can't be sure the People's Liberation Army sees things the same way? The PLA's successful test of an anti-satellite weapon early this year awakened the same fears.
Yes, having some degree of certainty, of reasonable boundaries, about what a nation might and might not do is an important element of international stability. With that point in mind, think of this: No one on earth can be sure that the U.S. government will not launch an aerial strike or a land invasion of Iran in the next 16 months.
Continue reading "On the problem of rogue states" »
What I wanted to ask Bill Clinton
(Resurrected from Aspen blog site)
A year ago, I had the chance to interview Bill Clinton on stage at the Aspen Ideas festival. (Description of the oddity of the whole situation here; video archive here.) This year Rick Stengel of Time magazine ably played that role. During the time for audience questions, I queued up to ask Clinton about something he had said. But as the clock ticked down at the end of the session, Stengel announced that there was time for one more question -- and the turn belong to a woman just ahead of me (and, to be fair about it, I'd already had more than my chance to pose questions to Clinton).
Here is what I wanted to ask. Sometime I would love to hear an answer:
Continue reading "What I wanted to ask Bill Clinton" »
Am I being too rational? The prospect of war on Iran
Starting late in 2004, I have been writing that the United States could not rationally comtemplate attacking Iran. (For reasons laid out in 2004, 2006, and 2007.) Through that time I have been arguing with friends, adversaries, and people I do not know, all of whom keep saying: rational or not, it's coming!
This dispute is strange in one obvious way.
Continue reading "Am I being too rational? The prospect of war on Iran" »
